THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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A NOTE ON THE NEGATIVE NORM
CHARLES W. PHILLIPS

THE PROBLEM OF RELATION IN SOME NON-SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHIES
CLIFFORD G. KOSSEL, S. J.

PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENCE AND POSITIVE RELIGION
JAMES COLLINS

BOOK REVIEWS

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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A NOTE ON THE NEGATIVE NORM*

"Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the proofs brought against faith are not demonstrations, but arguments that can be answered."—*Summa Theologica,* I, 1. 8c.

". . . [A]lthough the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest."—*Summa Theologica,* I, 1. 8 ad 2.

"The light of faith makes us see what we believe."—*Summa Theologica,* II-II, 1. 4 ad 3.

THERE is today a dogmatism against dogma: we are assured by all sorts of clever, well-meaning persons that assent to the dogmas of revealed religion amounts almost to an indecency, and this because in accepting what we are pleased to call the truths of faith we lose our intellectual freedom. He who believes in revelation loses his intellectual freedom (and his self-respect) because he binds himself to a creed; but it is better to have intellectual freedom than to have a creed: *ergo,* one ought not to accept revelation. It is our purpose here to attempt to disprove the major of this syllogism.

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

The unbeliever seems to have no problem of intellectual freedom. He is free to think anything he likes. His approach to this problem

**Editor's Note:* The author of this article in a letter to the editor states his own general position and the purpose of this paper as follows: "I am, I trust, a Scholastic, a Thomist, an Aristotelian, though of a rare variety; I am an Anglican Scholastic. It occurred to me that an essay of this sort, written as it is by one who is not expected to be a Scholastic, might have a bit more weight than the same sort of essay would have if it came from the pen of a Roman Catholic, for it is a most unfortunate fact that those who are not members of the Roman Catholic Church cannot believe that Scholastics really reach their conclusions by a process of reasoning."

might be formulated thus: "I do not commit myself to any cree whatever; but the problem of intellectual freedom does not arise unt one has committed oneself to a creed: *ergo,* for me no problem c intellectual freedom exists. I consider myself very fortunate indee for, in accepting no creed, I lose neither intellectual freedom nor m self-respect. On the other hand, the believer in revelation *is* face with this problem, and he is forced to lose either his intellectual free dom and his self-respect or his belief in the truths of faith (s called)."

This approach throws the burden of proof on the believer. It he who must make reply; it is he who must summon arguments t his defense. Furthermore, the believer has infinitely more at stake he has much more to defend. He has at stake what seems to hi the very truth of things; he has at stake a satisfactory intellectu statement of the very meaning of life; he has at stake a comple of emotional, aesthetic, moral, and intellectual attitudes towards th universe, a complex summed up in the term *religion.* It may see a small point to emphasize, but it is a point which must be ke before the mind at all times: to the believer, revelation is *true.* Th is really the crux of the whole matter; for it must be remembere that the believer in revelation assents to the proposition that th Ultimate Reality of the universe has made Himself known to ma and has made Himself known in such a way that man needs nothin more by way of revelation to enable him to live that life which wi gain for him the very goal of his existence. This is the point to b kept in mind throughout this discussion.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

The unbeliever's solution of the problem of intellectual freedom summed up in the easy proposition: "For me, there is no proble I am not bothered with this sort of thing. I have no creed, and s I am free to think as I choose and that without fear of committin heresy. The only heresy of which I can conceive is the heresy repudiating intellectual freedom."

"But," says the believer in divine revelation, "I have come to th conclusion that God has revealed Himself, and that in one particul religion. It is not only that I think He is the sort of Deity who likely to reveal Himself (a conclusion drawn in part from a co sideration of the religious nature of man, a nature which God h created; but also, a conclusion drawn in part from a consideration the nature of God Himself, of Him who is perfectly just); it also that I believe He has done just that, *has* revealed Himself man that man might know Him (and knowing Him, have life Now, if this be true, if revelation really reveals the truth, there

no problem of intellectual freedom for the believer. In believing in revelation, we believe the truth. *But this is precisely all anyone asks of intellectual freedom*—freedom to accept the truth." Thus the believer.

It should be obvious that here the believer has scored a point. No one asks to be free to believe in falsehoods and fancies (though the present writer once had an argument with a history instructor who insisted that freedom of the press implied the freedom to spread falsehood). If you believe that revelation tells you the *very* truth of things, you do not ask to be free to assent to some theory that tells you only a very small part of the truth of things, an extremely partial truth not unmixed with great error. From this standpoint, the whole discussion about intellectual freedom's not being compatible with assent to revelation is pointless. If you believe revealed religion actually *reveals* the truth, you would be indeed foolish to ask for the freedom to accept some notion that does not reveal the truth. Whether or not the believer is justified in accepting this particular revelation—or any revelation at all—is another matter entirely. It is a matter for the apologist, who clears the ground for assent to revelation, using the countless tools which he has at hand, of which not the least are the historical sciences. But it is something else also; it is a matter of faith.

The distinction between belief and knowledge, faith and science, is important to the apologist. It might be mentioned briefly here. We can know that there is a God, and we can know some facts about Him—and all in the light of natural reason alone. We can know, by the light of natural reason, that God is first cause, that in Him essence and existence are the same (He *is* all that He *has*), that He is pure act. This we can *see*. We cannot, in the nature of things, know whether and how God redeems man (who is so obviously in need of redemption), whether the Incarnation should take place, whether God is a Trinity. These things we cannot know by the natural light of reason; they must be shown to us, revealed to us, if we are to assent to them at all. It is in these truths that one *believes;* and one assents to them on the authority of God Himself. But the way in which one accepts this revelation is not the question in hand. The question under consideration is simply, Ought one accept revelation, make the assent of faith to the truths of revealed religion, when such acceptance and such assent necessarily imply a surrender of intellectual freedom (and loss of self-respect)? And the answer of the believer—to hazard a repetition—is this: In accepting revelation I believe I am accepting revealed truth; but freedom to accept the truth is the only freedom I ask: therefore, there is for me no real problem of intellectual freedom at all.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELIEVER'S SOLUTION

The problem of the relation of freedom of intellect to the acceptance of dogma exists only in the practical order, and not in the theoretical order. However difficult the problem may seem in the concrete, there is a solution to it. There is an answer to those who will agree with our theoretical solution (as outlined above) and who yet claim that the thing is difficult of solution in practise.

The solution of the practical aspects of the problem may be found in the fact that truth is one and universal. If we accept the proposition that truth is always true (as against the Pragmatists), we have in hand something to use as a weapon against those who think no practical solution is forthcoming. The clue to this matter is found in the obvious fact that (if God exists) the Author of Revealed Religion is the Author of Reason. He who is revealed by His own self-revelation is truth, and truth is accessible in some measure to unaided human reason. Furthermore, as Saint Thomas has shown once and for all, there are not two truths, but one; and it is impossible that the truth we reach by unaided human reason should contradict the truth which is revealed. It simply would not make sense. In itself it would be self-contradictory to deny the principle of contradiction. We deny the principle of contradiction if we assert that two contradictory truths are true. But all this is too obvious. Yet, if we look into the implications of this principle, we see first that he who assents to the dogmas of revealed religion need not fear truth no matter where it may be found. God does not contradict Himself. He does not tell us one thing through science, and then tell us the very opposite through revelation.

This means that the believer in revelation need not fear any genuine scientific discovery of any sort. Indeed, he ought not rashly accept each and every theory put out in the name of science; these are, after all, only theories. But he is required, in the very nature of things, to accept every *fact* discovered by science, for, after all, facts cannot be at variance with truth. For this reason, no believer ought to associate too intimately with those who are obscurantist, those who are afraid of "Science" and what it is going to do to "Religion." The believer ought to face facts with a freedom and a joy equal to—even greater than—that of the unbeliever. This would seem to be so very obvious as to need no expansion.

Then, too, there are those matters in which believers may disagree among themselves—the unessentials, the unrevealed, the speculative the unknown. The believer does not sacrifice his freedom to disagree with his fellows in such matters, for the believer desires to be free to accept only the truth. The believer ought to determine what are these unknowns or unessentials, and enjoy himself to the full in

disagreement. This makes for good intellectual exercise; it makes for self-improvement and self-discipline. And if one's conclusions in speculative matters seem to be at variance with revelation, one can only assume that he has made a mistake somewhere in his reasoning or that his reasoning is based upon insufficient facts. He will look to his premises; he will seek out further facts. As God, who is truth, cannot contradict Himself, so revelation cannot contradict reason.

The believer, then, has the freedom to investigate (under the proper safeguards) those beliefs which he deems false. This is not for every one. Some of us are not equipped by training or intellectual gifts to handle such notions. But those who are so equipped ought not feel—and generally do not feel—afraid to investigate false beliefs. There is, indeed, a positive religious value in such investigation: one is made all the more certain of his faith. (It might be suggested here that if one were to lose his religious faith because he found it to be at variance with the facts—*unquestionably so*—he would be better off without such faith. But the Christian has behind his faith the authority of God Himself, and will not find any facts or any truth to be in contradiction to Revelation.) If one's faith is at variance with evident truth, one is obliged to throw aside such a hindrance to intellectual honesty and the discovery of truth. But, here again, we must insist that one distinguish clearly between *fact* and *theory*.

Dogma alone, then, is unquestioned. The believer accepts the dogmas of revealed religion as being the revelation of truth. These revelations of the truth which he discovers in the dogmas of revealed religion he cannot question, for the simple reason that he accepts them, and accepts them in such a manner that they are for him a negative norm in all matters of philosophical speculation. No half-way position is possible: if he accepts these dogmas, he accepts them as revealed truth; if he does not accept them, he does not accept revelation. Heresy is, in this sense, a denial of revelation; that is, if one tampers with the bases of his faith, he cannot expect his religious superstructure to remain standing. In dogma, it is really all or nothing; and it is here that Modernism and much of modern Protestantism go off the deep end. However, it is to be remembered that systematic theology—the science which attempts to explicate dogma—is not dogma. Whatever is unessential in systematic theology is open to discussion. Dogma alone cannot be touched.

PARADOX OF THE UNBELIEVER

The unbeliever is in a strange position. He refuses to accept dogma because such acceptance means (to him) the loss of intellectual freedom; but he must be ever open to the acceptance of

dogma as a condition of one whose mind is not in any way bound (That the unbeliever does not accept any dogmas of any sort—unless he be a universal sceptic—is highly questionable. As M Belloc once asked, is there no dogma on the revolution of the earth There are more dogmas in science than many of her materialisti champions are willing to admit. See *The Dogma of Evolution,* b Louis T. More—a scientist, not a religionist. But all this is by wa of digression.) It is enough to see that the unbeliever justifies hi rejection of revealed religion on the ground that assent to revelatio would make intellectual freedom impossible; yet he is required, b his own terms, to keep his own mind open to the possibility of reve lation's being true.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let it be said that if we examine the syllogisr with which we began, we shall find that we must make the followin distinctions: He who believes in revelation loses his intellectual free dom only in the sense that he is no longer free to believe in notion that in the light of revelation he knows to be false; but freedom t believe in falsehood is not freedom at all: therefore, he who believe in revelation does not sacrifice real intellectual freedom. In prac tise, this means that the believer maintains his own self-respect, hi integrity, his intellectual honesty. It means that the believer face facts fearlessly, knowing that, as the same God who is Truth itsel is the Author of Reason and Revelation, he will find no facts whic contradict faith. It means that the believer is free—within certai proper limits—to disagree with his fellow-believers in matters un known, unrevealed, unessential, or merely of opinion; that (unde proper safeguards) he is free to examine into beliefs he consider false, for he knows his religion to be true. (If it is not true, h were better off without it. I emphasize this point because I fin myself annoyed by the statement one occasionally hears, "Wha difference does it make if it is not true—it's so comforting!" This i more common than one would like to think.) There is no contra diction here: the believer examines false notions, using revealed truth as the criterion of truth; should he discover *(per impossibl* that what he *thought* to be revealed truth is false, he would n longer hold to this so-called revelation. In fine, this means tha it is not necessary to toss aside one's beliefs to make a free and fa examination of those ideas which one believes false. And in th end, it all comes to this: belief in revelation does not make on an imbecile ten degrees removed from sanity and intellectual probity

CHARLES WILLIAM PHILLIPS

New York City

THE PROBLEM OF RELATION IN SOME NON-SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHIES

FOR MANY years the category of relation has been a subject of dispute between idealists and a varied group of philosophers usually classed as realists. Both sides believe that basic positions in philosophy turn on the interpretation and use of that category. However, in explicit development their theories of relation are not first either historically or logically; both derive from more fundamental positions in epistemology and metaphysics.

For this reason a study of their views may serve several purposes. It is helpful in understanding the meaning of *system* in modern philosophy; it occasionally offers valid insights and thoughtful analyses of relation itself; and finally, and most important, it reveals the close dependence of a theory of relation on other philosophical problems, a dependence which, if fully realized, could be helpful in clarifying and developing the Scholastic theory of relation. The purpose of this article is to study that dependence by outlining (1) briefly its historical development, and (2) the general argument for the opposing theories.

To get our bearings, we may ask by reason of what function relation is considered so important. I believe that Professor Dewey in his article on relation in Baldwin's *Dictionary*[1] has seen the modern approach quite accurately. It is summed up in what he calls the metaphysical problem of relation:

> How can a belief or judgment regarding one fact affect the content of our judgment or belief of another disparate fact? What is the guarantee of the assumption of validity attaching to such a transfer? This is the question of the ontological or real worth of the logical use of relation . . . [which] all judgment and inference presuppose. . . . [Science] rests on the postulate of some sort of relation between any given fact and some other fact—a relation which is the real, even if concealed, foundation of any scientific statement about either one taken separately.[2]

Relation, then, is expected to provide nothing less than the guarantee for the validity of judgment, inference, and science. That is a big order, and we may legitimately ask how this category came into such prominence.

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[1] *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1911), II, 439 ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 440.

I. ORIGINS

A. LOCKE

For a description of the proximate origins of this position, w may conveniently begin with Locke who, according to Professo Dewey, made the transition from the medieval universal by definin knowledge as "nothing but the perception of the connection of an agreement and disagreement of and repugnance of our ideas."[3] H does not nominally define knowledge as relation, but all his "kinds of knowledge except one, that of existence, are relations; and s relation is the central thing in knowledge.

We recall that in Locke's empiricism the knower is purely passiv in the reception of the *materials* of knowledge, the simple ideas o sensation and reflection. But *knowledge* itself is an activity of th mind which consists in combining and comparing ideas or in referrin them to things.[4] The latter is based on what he maintains is a intuitive knowledge of the existence of things. But this knowledg gives us little; it tells us merely that for a simple idea there is a extramental cause which is something like the idea. It gives us n notion of the real essence, the internal structure, of things whic is the supposed source of those qualities which cause the ideas.[5]

Hence most of our knowledge deals with those combinations whic Locke calls complex ideas and whose unity derives entirely from th mind which combines them and gives them a name.[6] Thus ideas o substances are a combination of qualities and powers together wit an unknown support or substratum to which they are supposed t belong and which is called the general idea of substance.[7] Th knowledge, then, turns out to be a system of qualities in relatio i.e., of simple ideas, which are all qualitative, in various combination The judgment becomes the addition of one idea to another idea o group of ideas; reasoning and inference are the following through o a series of ideas intermediately related.[8]

These combinations are based on some relationship between th ideas. But are these mental relations representative of some real rel tions among things? Locke clearly states that relation "is not co tained in the existence of things, but [is] something extraneous an superinduced." All words and ideas which are absolute and positiv "are supposed really to exist in that thing to which the word applied," but relative words "carry the mind to something else se

[3] John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. A. S. Pringl Pattison (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 255. (All references are this edition.) Dewey had said previously that the medievals identified relatio and universals. We may pass over this error here.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 92, 151, 215, 255.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 233 ff., 297, 309 ff.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 240-1.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 154-66, 226 ff., 242 ff.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 344 ff.

arate, and exterior to the existence of that thing."[9] In short, the mind does not see relations among things, but perceives or sets up relations among ideas.[10]

Indeed, he speaks of a necessary dependence of things on one another, of a similitude furnished by nature, of a union of things in nature.[11] But these seem obviously to be assertions of his good sense and independent of his epistemology. In his atomic and sensist theory we could have no knowledge of relations among things even if they did exist. The only connections we know are between ideas, which are refined sensations, and relation is not perceptible to the senses. Relation, then, is a mental product, and knowledge as a system of related ideas is also a mental product telling us not a whit about the nature or order of things. The mind is conversant only with its own ideas.

B. HUME

It remained for Hume to bring this atomic view of knowledge to its logical conclusion; to strip the mind of any knowledge of existence beyond that of the ideas; to cut off any possibility of arriving at necessary connections between things. He relies, as Locke did, on the nominalist supposition that there is no intellectual intuition of natures. Ideas are faint images of the original impressions of sensation, passion, and emotion; they are so completely distinct that no two are perfectly inseparable; the supposed inseparable connection is a "gentle force, which commonly prevails," an attraction rooted in the "*original* qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain."[12]

He says that there is no idea of substance distinct from the collection of particular qualities closely related by contiguity and causation, with a name attached to them, and supposed to inhere in an unknown something. In general, abstract ideas ". . . are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them."[13]

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[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 175 ff.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 136—all ideas carry with them a relation; pp. 261 ff. and 276 ff. —some of these relations are intuitively perceived.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 294-97, 231, 249-51.

[12] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 1-13.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17. D. J. B. Hawkins makes an apt observation: "Of course, in supposing an explicit knowledge of similarities, he implicitly admits the possibility of abstraction in the traditional sense, and equally obviously his denial of abstraction does not prevent him from employing what in fact are abstract concepts. Nevertheless, it does prevent him from seeing clearly what they imply of the structure of things, and it makes an intellectualist view of causality impossible" (*Causality and Implication* [London: Sheed and Ward, 1937], p. 30).

The relations, then, between these individual, perfectly separable ideas originate in some psychological tendency.[14] Moreover, some of them are immediately perceived when the two terms are given in sensation. But any observations about such relations are not reasoning because they tell us nothing about the existence of objects or the relations between them. Here Hume uses the distinction between the reception of the materials of knowledge and the activity which belongs to thought.

> When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call *this* perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impression thro' the organs of sensation. . . . [Hence] we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we make concerning *identity,* and the relations of *time* and *place; since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects.*[15]

Now causality is the only relation which pretends to reach beyond immediately perceptible terms either to arrive at the existence of things (as Locke had done) or to show some necessary connection between objects. Hume therefore concentrates on its destruction. Three relations, he says, are implied in causal inference: contiguity, temporal succession, a necessary connection. But the latter can be reduced to no impression, i.e., it is not given with the ideas in sensation. Moreover since no idea in itself implies the existence of any other idea, the ideas cannot be the source of the inference. The inference, then, depends only on the first two relations; it results from the experience of the constant conjunction of like impressions and ideas, and this is no warrant of necessity.[16]

Thus real causation and any universal and necessary scientific inferences based on it are destroyed. Causation is the object of belief, not of certain knowledge, and we get the famous definition:

> A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.[17]

We need not conjecture about Hume's cosmos. He gives a clear and honest description of the kind of universe left for human knowledge by this empirical nominalism. It is made up of two systems: one comprehends the ideas of memory joined to our present im-

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[14] Some relations depend entirely on the ideas (they are "internal" in contemporary terminology), i.e., you cannot change the relations without changing the ideas or vice versa. They give rise to the only two exact sciences, arithmetic and algebra. Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 13 ff. and 69 ff.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 73. (Italics in last clause are mine.)

[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 75-78, 86 ff., 162. Hawkins gives a good summary of Hume's position on causality (*Causality and Implication,* p. 30-36).

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 170.

pressions; the second consists of ideas joined to the first group by causation, i.e., by custom.

> Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system join'd to the present impressions, we are pleased to call a *reality*. But the mind stops not here. For finding, that with this system of perceptions, there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause and effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas; and as it feels that 'tis in a manner necessarily determin'd to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or relation, by which it is determin'd, admits not of the least change, it forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of *realities*. The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses; the second of the judgment.
>
> 'Tis the latter which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination. . .[18]

The examples which follow this passage could well fit into the idealist theory of truth by coherence; and he agrees with the idealists that the true idea of mind (and of reality) is to be found in a system of connected perceptions.[19]

C. KANT

Kant was sure that there are sciences with universal and necessary propositions; that the source of the latter cannot be found in experience; that they cannot be explained by repeated association.[20] He was also sure that these propositions are not purely explicative, i.e., analytic, but ampliative, i.e., synthetic. Since experience does not yield universality and necessity, these must have an a priori source, i.e., a source independent of experience. Hence the proper problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?"[21] Kant answers with his "Copernican revolution." He grants that knowledge begins with experience, but adds that it is not all derived from experience. For the very possibility of intelligible experience supposes understanding, and understanding acts according to immanent and necessary laws. In short, knowledge does not conform to objects, but objects to knowledge.[22]

His specific answer to Hume and Locke would run something like this: "You suppose that the matter of knowledge, the data given

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 261. This becomes difficult, of course, when we recall that all distinct perceptions are distinct existences with no connections; it would seem that there must be a mind to bring about the connections; but of a mind distinct from perceptions we have no idea. Hume admits his inability to explain this. Cf. *ibid.*, Appendix, p. 635-36.

[20] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 43.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 48-55.

[22] *Ibid.*, Preface to Second Edition, p. 22, and Introduction, p. 41-42.

to the subject, are objects or ideas already formed and distinct. You then suppose that the activity of knowing consists in juggling these ideas, according to some more or less necessary psychological habits into a system which gives the appearance of necessity and coherence. You are wrong; neither ideas nor objects are given to the subject. The matter of knowledge is simply the chaotic flow of sensations or the sense-manifold. It is precisely the function of the subject to form, distinguish, and order this chaotic mass. It does this by successively subjecting the matter to certain necessary forms or laws of sensible intuition, imagination, and understanding. The last synthesis, made by the judgment, brings the matter to objective unity; thus the judgment makes objects or ideas, and this is knowledge."[23]

The judgment, then, as the faculty of thought, constructs its objects for which both matter (sensible intuition) and forms (categories) are required. Without the categories an intuition cannot be thought (judged, synthesized), and without an intuition the category is empty and merely formal. And here is the main point. Since we have only a sensible intuition, real knowledge is confined to the sphere of appearances; the categories cannot be used as predicates determining *noumena,* things in themselves. For noumena are not "given" to the subject and the attempt to apply categories to them is adding emptiness to emptiness—an illusion.[24]

Knowledge, then, is a system of appearances, entirely determined by their relations to one another. Hume had granted a psychological necessity in thought; owing to the "original qualities of human nature" we must think this way. But for him the object, the system thought, was not necessary because the relations were merely external. But for Kant the necessity is epistemological; it is the very condition of knowing. And the system constructed is necessary because the relations, being the very form of the object, are completely internal and necessary. Knowing is judging, and judging is synthesizing, and the relations are nothing but the forms or laws by which the mind operates this synthesis; they therefore pass over to the known, becoming the internal and necessary structure of the total object.[25]

However, this first universe of knowledge is like Hume's first one at least in this, that it is a system of ideas immediately verifiable in sense intuition. But even in the sphere of pure reason Kant, like Hume, offers a second universe, also like Hume's second in so far as it lies beyond the realm of possible experience and hence has no scientific validity. Let us describe it briefly so that we may recognize its echoes.

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 65-67, 92-93, 111, 121, 201; developed in the transcendental deduction of the categories (1st ed.), pp. 129-50; (2d ed.), pp. 151-75.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 92-93, 100, 105-6, 252-75.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26, 33-34, 87, 102, 188, 194 ff., 291.

Kant says that human reason naturally and necessarily aims at a higher systematic unity through certain "transcendental" (a priori) ideas of pure reason. There is also a tendency to consider these ideas as corresponding to objects beyond the range of all possible experience (noumena). This is the illusion of false metaphysics. For these ideas are not properly constitutive, but regulative; they do not create concepts, but order the pure concepts of the understanding. The criterion of their truth is simply the requirement of systematic unity.

But these ideas of reason are not useless. While they do not extend our knowledge beyond experience, they do extend the possibility of experience itself by providing hypotheses which can be fruitful guides to the investigation of nature. For instance, we proceed *as if* the world had its source in a supreme being with a purpose, and thus attain the highest formal unity, the teleological system, which can aid us in ordering our experience of nature. But this being remains only an idea-object, not a reality; it is not verifiable in experience and none of the predicates of the understanding can be applied to it. It remains the supposed but *unknown substratum* (Locke's *substance* or Hume's *mind*) of the systematic unity, order, and purposiveness of the universe.[26]

By his defense of scientific necessity Kant hoped to escape the scepticism of Hume. But he began by assuming a basic tenet of empirical nominalism, viz., that we have only sense intuition and that knowledge consists in somehow relating what is given in that intuition. Sense intuition, then, exhausts the realm of the knowable and of being. In fact, being or existence is nothing but the possibility of verifying a concept in sense intuition; or, logically, it is the copula of the proposition and signifies merely the necessary relation of intuition to the unity of apperception, the ego.[27]

Hence being and knowing are judging, and the latter is the logical construction of a constantly expanding system of related propositions whose matter is reducible to sense intuitions. Necessity is saved by making not only the relations but the objects mental products. Beyond this mental system lie things, the objects of metaphysics, for us unknowable and non-being. But moral reason, which alone attains the unconditioned, justifies our faith in them. "I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge,* in order to make room for *faith.*"[28]

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[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 532-70, 318-29.

[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 157-59, 243, 247-48, 503-7.

[28] *Ibid.,* pp. 24-30, 319. I have treated only *proximate* origins beyond which contemporary non-Scholastics, especially English-speaking ones, rarely look. Of course the tradition goes back at least to medieval nominalism with that attitude which has aptly been called "scientism." Cf. Wellmuth, *The Nature and Origins of Scientism* (Milwaukee: Marquette, 1944). The identity of

II. IDEALISM: INTERNAL RELATIONS

The notions of coherence and system as the ideal of thought are, then, already present in the tradition. The well-known attempts to fill the gaps in Kant's theory, to make a new deduction of the categories in one all-comprehensive system, led to theories of the Absolute as will or idea internally differentiating itself in appearance. Always, however, the theory of the judgment remained essentially the same as that of Kant.[29]

In England Bradley attempted to combine Hegelian absolutism with the older English empiricism by making experience itself the absolute. He especially brought the theory to center around relations. However, for a clearer exposition of the grounds of the theory, we turn to a more recent exponent, Professor Brand Blanshard,[30] who is also better aware of the criticisms of this view.

His theory of relation occupies the last two chapters of his work, but to appreciate these chapters we must have a general view of the antecedents. His investigation begins with the judgment, which he says is the simplest form of thought because nothing simpler could yield truth or falsity. And perception, "that experience in which, on the warrant of something given in sensation at the time, we unreflectingly take some object to be before us," is the simplest form of judgment. Sensation is below the perceptual level since we must take the sensation *as* something to have perception.[31]

Above the level of sense-bound perceptual thought is the level of science where we deal with "free ideas." In perception we take sensation *as* something, therefore as distinct, as the embodiment of a universal, and as related to other things.[32] A "free idea" is the explicit reference to what at the moment is not explicitly given in sensation.[33] But to get a proper notion of the idea, we must consider it teleologically, as we do thought. The idea is the *purpose* present in thought, a *potentiality* whose *actuality* is identical with the object and the aim of thought.[34]

What, then, is the aim of thought? He distinguishes a twofold end: the first is immanent: ". . . to achieve a state of insight which will bring the theoretic impulse to rest"; the second is transcendent:

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theses in the old and new nominalism is striking. On medieval nominalism let it suffice here to refer to the excellent articles by Paul Vigneaux, "Nominalisme," *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique,* eds. Vacant, Mangenot, *et al.* (Paris, 1931), Tome XI, cols. 717-84; and "Occam," Sec. III, cols. 876-88.

[29] A good account of this is given by C. R. Morris, *Idealistic Logic* (London: Macmillan, 1933), chaps. vi-viii.

[30] *The Nature of Thought* (2 vols.; London: Allen & Unwin, 1939).

[31] *Ibid.,* I, 51-53.

[32] *Ibid.,* I, 61-67. Hence sensation, as having a reference to a wider order of universals, already reveals the systematic aim of thought. Cf. pp. 67-68.

[33] *Ibid.,* I, 251 ff.

[34] *Ibid.,* I, 473.

". . . to apprehend the nature of things, to see things as they are." Ultimately these two ends will coincide, for "thought discloses reality in the degree to which it achieves its own ideal."[35] We cannot, of course, know the transcendent end until we attain it, but we can get a general notion of it by studying the movement of thought towards its immanent end.

This movement presupposes some whole to start from, for "one cannot play a game that has no rules." This whole may be only the world of common sense which is already a minimal system.[36] Reflection arises from the challenge of something which seems to lie outside our present system of ideas, and which thought must integrate and render intelligible by widening its system to include the new experience.[37] This ultimately leads to the conclusion that the test of truth is coherence within a system. In fact the elaboration of the system and its verification are the same thing viewed from different aspects. At this critical point we let Professor Blanshard speak for himself:

> What makes them appear so different is the unanalysed belief, that in verification we have left behind the region of internal web-spinning and system-building and got at last into contact with naked fact. It will readily enough be admitted that verification does appeal to coherence, but it will be contended that the only value of this coherence lies in its resting, at one end, on what is independently given. In the last resort, it will be said, we take tables and chairs to be facts, not because our judgments about them cohere with something else, but because they are given in perception. Thus coherence is not the whole story, and to make it the whole story would be like building a bridge without any piers to support the span. Now in a sense we admit all this, in the sense, namely, that there is such a thing as givenness. How then can we continue to treat verification as if it involved nothing but coherence? For this reason, that as soon as we attempt to say *what* is given, we find ourselves thrown back upon coherence anyhow. The solid piers of fact, supposed to be standing there in broad daylight as the bases of our structure of theory, are illusion. There are no such things. The 'facts' that were to support our system are themselves relative to the system. In short, *the coherence of judgment within a system is our test, and our only test, of any truth of fact whatever.*[38]

This is, of course, the Kantian theory in full bloom. Facts are judgments; ideas receive their meaning only from the context of the judgment; the structure of the object is determined by the mind in judgment.[39]

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[35] *Ibid.*, I, 489-92. Anyone acquainted with Bradley's works will see throughout this exposition many similarities with his doctrine, and occasional differences. On the present point cf. *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), pp. 219 and 317 ff.

[36] *Ibid.*, II, 53-54.

[37] *Ibid.*, II, 40 ff.

[38] *Ibid.*, II, 214-15. (Italics in the last sentence are mine.)

[39] *Ibid.*, I, 228: "What theory takes as fact and actually uses as such is another judgment, or set of judgments, and what provides the verification is the coherence between the initial judgment and these." Cf. also pp. 231

Conclusions now follow quickly. If the immanent end of thought is coherent system, then its correlative, the nature of reality, and the relation between these two, truth, must also be coherent system.

> What better key can one ask to the structure of the real? Our own conviction is that we should take this immanent end of thought in all seriousness as the clue to the nature of things. We admit that it may prove deceptive, that somewhere thought may end its pilgrimage in frustration and futility before some blank wall of the unintelligible.

The latter is the attitude of the sceptic, a compound of timidity and "a refusal to hope lest they be disillusioned." But the

> brighter view . . . is that reality is a system, completely ordered and fully intelligible, and with which thought in its advance is more and more identifying itself.[40]

This means that truth is the whole. Any finite judgment is true only to the degree in which it is relevant to, and could maintain itself in, the completed system. Hence every judgment must be conditional pending our discovery of its relations to the whole.[41] This theory of judgment leads directly to the theory of internal relations:

> To entertain an idea at all is to launch oneself on a course of defining one's object which, if allowed to complete itself, would make that determinate, that is, fix its relations to everything else. And so far as thought remained true to its immanent end, it must take these relations, not as a disorderly litter, but as an intelligible system.[42]

Now besides possessing consistency and comprehensiveness, a system that is to satisfy thought in its immanent end must also be such that its components are linked by necessity.[43] The theory of internal relations is an attempt to reveal that the transcendent end, the nature of reality, is also a necessary system.

> We must admit that there is no direct road by which we can prove that the intellectual ideal is applicable to the real world. There are those however who attempt to extract from us a larger admission, namely, that this ideal is *in*applicable. . . . They say that in the sort of system we have in mind all relations are internal, whereas many of the relations we find in experience are obviously and irremediably external. . . .
>
> This question . . . threatens the success of our whole endeavour. For of what use is it to prove that the ideal of thought is thus and so, if that ideal is irrelevant to the world that is to be known?[44]

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and 233. He constantly appeals to facts, and in one place (I, 612) says that "the best defense of any theory is to show that it fits the facts." This looks like a relapse into naive realism, but he would undoubtedly say that the "facts" are previous judgments, constructions, which means ultimately a return to the common-sense world-system which constitutes the rules of the game. Of course, we may be playing different games, and it would be useless to judge my theory by his "facts" or vice versa.

[40] *Ibid.*, II, 73-74. Cf. also pp. 302-3.

[41] *Ibid.*, II, 304-24. In this he is admittedly following Bradley's theory of the judgment, for which cf. *Essays*, pp. 175 ff, 224-38, 333-34.

[42] *Ibid.*, II, 330.

[43] *Ibid.*, II, 331; cf. also pp. 264, 429, 449.

[44] *Ibid.*, II, 449-50.

Professor Blanshard says that the internal theory means

> (1) that every term, i.e., every possible object of thought, is what it is in virtue of relations to what is other than itself; (2) that its nature is affected thus not by some of its relations only, but in different degrees by all of them, no matter how external they may seem; (3) that in consequence of (2) and of the further obvious fact that everything is related in *some* way to everything else, no knowledge will reveal completely the nature of any term until it has exhausted the term's relations to everything else.[45]

The supports of this position are reducible to two points. One is the idealist doctrine of the concrete universal; the second, which is really a corollary, is their doctrine of causal necessity. The first includes (1) a denial of any but a distinction of degree between essence, property, and accident, and (2) the assertion that a thing is defined by all these plus its relations.

He admits that there are universals because without them judgment would be meaningless. But what sort of entities are they? The traditional logic answers with its doctrine of the general idea as an *abstract* universal. Such an idea is the thought of a class; its *intension* is the set of attributes common to the class; its *extension* is the individuals of the class who possess the attributes. The abstract universal is the logical intension, and that is what is before us when we think of these objects. As we ascend to higher classes, thought grows thinner till we arrive at that which all things have in common, mere being. The most general idea is the emptiest. But such a universal, he says, can neither exist in nature nor be thought. For the properties of a thing in nature are internally affected by its other properties, and a genus cannot be thought except through the differentiations which characterize it in existence. Without these it is *empty*.[46]

His key to the solution is, again, the distinction between purpose and realization. The genus is related to its species as the potential to the actual. The universal exists in idea as a vital process "that moves to its end through a differentiation which comes from within." The idea expands, grows richer rather than thinner, as it is embodied in its members, and its true nature will be revealed only when thought has grasped the whole, not merely an essence.[47] He does admit degrees of relevancy: "There is still good sense in saying that the possession of a heart is *more* essential to man than

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[45] *Ibid.*, II, 452. For other expressions cf. p. 475: neither term could be different without entailing a difference in the other; p. 476: a relation could not change without a change in the term; p. 482: if the terms were different the relations would be different; relations are grounded in the nature of their terms. This seems to include most of the meanings enumerated by A. C. Ewing as common to idealists (*Idealism: A Critical Survey* [London: Methuen, 1934], pp. 121-36).

[46] *Ibid.*, I, 581 ff.

[47] *Ibid.*, I, 610 ff.

the possession of a little finger."[48] But the difference is only one of degree; essence and properties merge into one another.

The same is true of accidents when we try to apply them in the concrete.

> A man may be a man without driving a plough; therefore driving a plough is an accident. But one cannot drive a plough without being a man; hence the latter is not an accident. . . . [The] difficulty is that in the first case we are conceiving humanity as a bare abstraction and ploughing as another bare abstraction, and between these two barren bones there is no living connection; in the second case we are conceiving humanity as exemplified in a concrete man who drives a plough. And clearly it is this second kind of conception we must work with if our reasoning is to apply to actual things. The humanity that can be lifted identically out of all men is the sort of abstract universal which, as we have seen long ago, could not even intelligibly have species. But if we work with humanity as actually embodied in the man Hodges, it will be so modified and permeated by the influence of its context that *every action of the man will begin to take on the aspect of necessity.*[49]

Here we come to the second aspect of the concrete universal. The true nature of an individual includes essence, properties, and accidents, and it must be defined by all these plus its relations. The question arises: If ideas are universal, how can they reach the unique existence of things? Let us follow the actual process. When we attempt to define the unique, we begin by enumerating its qualities and relations. But since any selected group could be found elsewhere, they fail to define. Yet the mind goes on in the attempt and it would reach its goal when it had fixed the relations of the "what" before it to everything else in the one real universe.[50]

Relations are, indeed, as truly universals as qualities; that is why no finite set can confer uniqueness. But he holds that what gives apparent particularity is itself universal; in fact, there are no particulars as such. That the particular and the universal are ultimate disparates is an illusion. There is no particularity in things "that is alien to thought and unassimilable by it, nothing that resists inclusion in that intelligible system of universals at which thought aims."[51] Thought cannot exhaust all a thing's relations in its finite judgments, but it can do so when it achieves its end, identity with the universe of things. This means that *"the only true particular is the absolute."*[52]

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[48] *Ibid.*, II, 297-98.

[49] *Ibid.*, II, 300. (Italics mine.) Cf. also p. 480.

[50] *Ibid.*, I, 502-6.

[51] *Ibid.*, I, 632-33. He mentions here Bradley's early aversion to such an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." But the demand for intelligibility won out in the end.

[52] *Ibid.*, I, 639. (Italics mine.) Hence "particulars" can be neither subjects nor predicates in judgment, because both of these must be universal. "It is a mere mistake to take the grammatical, or even the logical, subject of judgment as necessarily the true subject. These are as genuinely universals

ience a thing's relations are essential to its being what it is. Consider an example. What makes these stones "these" is their relations to all other things—where they came from, who brought them, their position in the building, etc., until we exhaust reality. And this applies to all universals since all are determined by the system in which they stand.[53] We cannot, then, know anything completely until we know everything, and "everything" is the absolute, the only individual.

Now to the second ground of the theory. Among relations causality is the most important because it reveals the necessity in the system. Two propositions would establish that everything in the universe is internally related to everything else:

> (i) that all things are *causally* related, directly or indirectly; (ii) that to be being causally related involves being logically related.[54]

The objections against the first, says Professor Blanshard, are easily answered by the theory of indirect and common causes. But the other proposition has been attacked more vigorously by the regularity theory proposed by Hume and widely accepted today.

He shows quite well that there must be some uniformity and intrinsic connection in causation. But he says there is more than *some* connection; there is a *necessary* relation. His argument is this:

> To say that *a* produces *x* in virtue of being *a* and yet that, given *a*, *x* might not follow, is inconsistent with the laws of identity and contradiction.[55]

We must be careful to grasp the argument correctly. Professor Blanshard would not subscribe to a statement in which we substituted determined values for the variables thus:

> To say that an apple tree produces apples in virtue of being an apple tree and yet that, given the apple tree, the apples might not follow, is inconsistent with the laws of identity and contradiction.

This would not be obvious; in fact it would seem that nature rather frequently violates these laws.

But that is not the argument. In our substitution we used abstract universals, "apple tree," "apples." Professor Blanshard is dealing with a "this," a concrete universal. It is not a mere abstract set of qualities, but a set of qualities in a set of relations without which the object loses its "thisness." *This* apple tree cannot be defined by an essence or by its qualities, because it also includes its relations, and

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as the grammatical or logical predicate. What is asserted is the universal, or the complex of universals represented by both together; and as for the subject, 'the true subject of the judgment is, not this or that finite person or thing, but the ultimate reality'" (p. 647). The quotation is from Bradley, *Principles of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), I, 181.

[53] *Ibid.*, II, 486-92.

[54] *Ibid.*, II, 492.

[55] *Ibid.*, II, 512-16.

in this case the relation of causality in the production of these apples. To strip it of this relation is to say that it did and that it did not act thus, and that it is other than it is.

It might appear that he was saying only that the nature of a thing determines the type of activity which follows from it. But he means more. He means that every particular action and effect are just as determined as the operative nature. The so-called accidental operations and relations are just as internal and necessary to a thing's definition as its properites or essence.[56] If this were not so these relations would not be intelligible, i.e., would not fit into a logical system. Then the immanent end of thought might be a will-o'-the-wisp, irrelevant to the nature of things. This equation of contingency and unintelligibility, and of intelligibility with logical necessity are clearly asserted in the conclusion.

> The ideal of complete understanding would be achieved only when this system that rendered it [anything] necessary was not a system that itself was *fragmentary and therefore contingent,* but one that was all-inclusive and so organized internally that every part was linked to every other by *intelligible necessity.* . . . Such an ideal appears ludicrously remote from the world of actual experience, where we are met at every turn by *seeming contingency and unintelligibility.* . . . But we have seen that in the very nature of terms in relation, there is ground for believing that such *contingency is apparent only.* There is nothing to stay our conclusion that with its approximation to its immanent end, the achievement of *systematic necessity,* thought is also approximating its transcendent end, the apprehension of the *real.*[57]

We have not come far from the sources. In this theory we have again the empiricist assumption that the given is mere sensation. "Things" are not seen by sense and/or intellect; things are ideas and ideas are thought, that is, constructed by the judgment.[58] Judg-

[56] That he is ascribing to particular actions the same necessity as to operative determination can be seen from several references. Cf. the italicized words in the passage quoted by us on p. 72; cf. also *ibid.,* pp. 478-79, 482 ff., 515. This bears out Ewing's statement that the internal theory seems to mean that "the connection of different things and different events is capable of a rational explanation deducible a priori from their nature, not indeed by our mind, but at any rate by a mind which possessed real insight into this nature" (*Idealism,* p. 152).

Again, Ewing, speaking of the first sense of internal relations (relations fall within the nature of their terms), says that if nature is taken as anything predicable of the term, then the theory is obvious (*ibid.,* p. 119). That *is* what the idealists mean by their doctrine of the concrete universal; and that is why many counterarguments fail to touch them.

What is not so obvious is that there is no more than a distinction of degree between essence, property, and accident. Blanshard's denial of any other distinction does not prevent him from using a sharper distinction very effectively against what he thinks is the theory of the abstract universal. Cf. *Nature of Thought,* I, 585-86.

[57] *Ibid.,* II, 516-17. (Italics mine.)

[58] *Ibid.,* I, 542: "We have made no attempt to distinguish between an earlier use of ideas and the later making of judgment, for there really is no distinction. To have an idea is to judge from the very first . . ."

g is relating, knowing something *as* something, i.e., as distinct from hers, then as similar to, cause of, etc. And terms are again qualities groups of qualities in relation. Kant's a priori form has become e immanent end working in the idea, a potentiality which actualizes elf by ordering the matter (categorizing) which is at the same me a widening of experience.[59] But the ultimate ideas of sysmatic unity are not merely regulative, as Kant thought; they are so constitutive, for the idea actualized is the object.

But reality remains a matter of faith; there is no direct proof r it. With the "brighter view" he hopes that the complete idea the unconditional judgment) will be identical with the object, the bsolute and only real individual (the exhaustive system of terms in lation). This alone makes the immanent tendency of thought relevant to reality. He does not suppose that the "desire of the moth reates the star,"[60] but he does suppose that it tells us what the nseen star is.

III. LOGICAL ATOMISM: EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Finally, causality is equated with logical implication and carries s conditions of necessity. This excludes contingency and, on the asis of the concrete universal, finite individuality from the real. he so-called individual is a collection of universals bound by relaions which are also universals. These are the theses which make up he theory of internal relations.[61]

A group of philosophers who favor pluralism and contingency laim to avoid these conclusions by a theory of external relations. n general this means that relatedness is compatible with independence. Terms may pass in and out of relations with other terms without alteration of their natures; a thing's relations do not make its nature, nor do all necessarily follow from its nature; many relations are merely casual conjunctions. Most of these philosophers agree that some relations may be internal and that all relations may be partially internal, i.e., relations presuppose a "common determinable" without which the terms could not be thus related.[62]

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[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 526, 533.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 493.

[61] Another interesting idealist attempt to make relation the basic category is that of Octave Hamelin. Cf. the fine study by Leslie J. Beck, *La Méthode Synthétique d'Hamelin* (Collection "Philosophie de l'esprit"; Paris: Fernand Aubier, 1935).

[62] Cf. E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 177; G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies* (London: Kegan Paul, 1922), p. 288 ff.; Ralph Barton Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York: Longmans, 1929), pp. 244, 319, and *passim;* E. B. Holt *et al., The New Realism* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 33 and *passim;* Ewing, *Idealism,* pp. 126, 134; Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London: Longmans, 1925), p 110. William James plays this theme so much that it is superfluous to give references here. Some of the new realists derive their theories of relation in part from James's theory of consciousness, but this is not its most important aspect so I omit a consideration of it here.

Their polemic then is directed against the position that all relations are entirely internal. The source of that theory, they say, is the subject-predicate logic and its counterpart, the substance-attribute ontology. This logic assumes that every type of proposition can be reduced to the attribution of a predicate to a subject in which it somehow inheres like a quality. From this it follows that relation, being a predicate, intrinsically modifies its subject which could not be what it is without the relation. Ontologically the attributes inhere in substance, and all the attributes constitute the complete subject. This leads to monism when substance is translated as whole, reality, absolute, which becomes the one subject of all predicates. And it leads to the coherence theory in which each part is what it is from its place in the whole which holds the parts together.[63]

Most defenders of the external theory hold that philosophy depends on logic; many identify it with logic; and one leading proponent further identifies logic with pure mathematics.[64] But for the old logic they substitute the new mathematical logic, and this is the chief source and support of their theory of relations.

Without entering into the details or development of this logic,[65] we can see its bearing on the theory of relations by considering some of its features as proposed by Russell. For him pure mathematics (pure logic and philosophy) is entirely an a priori, deductive, and hypothetical science. Psychologically it may depend on experience, but in the logical order it is entirely independent of it and can neither be proved nor disproved by an appeal to experience. For its propositions do not deal with any particular things discoverable by the senses; they are true of any possible world but say nothing of any particular world or of the things in it. As the science of the possible, it "provides an inventory of possibilities, a repertory of abstractly tenable hypotheses."[66]

Science begins with certain ideas and axioms from which we can deduce, according to the rules of logic, conclusions which will be general and hypothetical like the premises; the set of propositions constituting the deductive science will be of the form "if p then q"

[63] Cf. Spaulding, *New Rationalism,* pp. 9 ff. and 35; Russell, "Logical Atomism," in *Contemporary British Philosophy,* first series, ed. Muirhead, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1924), pp. 360, 368.

It will be noted that the subject-predicate logic referred to is always that of Leibniz—*praedicatum inest subjecto*—and no distinction is made between his logic and that of Aristotle. On this cf. Ewing, *Idealism,* p. 122.

[64] Cf. Holt *et al., New Realism,* pp. 21-26; Russell, *Contemporary British Philosophy,* p. 159, and *Mysticism,* pp. 76, 111.

[65] On this cf. Aliotta, *Idealistic Reaction against Science,* trans. McCaskill (London: Macmillan, 1914), Part II, chaps. i and ii; Russell, *Mysticism,* pp. 74 ff.; C. I. Lewis, *A Survey of Symbolic Logic* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1918).

[66] Russell, *Mysticism,* p. 112.

ere p and q stand for propositions containing nothing but variables, d where we neither ask nor say anything about the truth of the mises. The only truth value they have is in resolving the sup- sed antinomies thus showing that this or that hypothesis *may* be e. Hence another famous definition: "Thus mathematics may defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talk- g about, nor whether what we are saying is true."[67]

Since these propositions say nothing about anything we may ask nat they contain. Russell says that in an empirical proposition ch as "Socrates was before Aristotle," the constituents are two rms and a relation, Socrates, Aristotle, and "before." But besides ese, the proposition has a certain form. If we substitute variables r all the constituents, we get a logical proposition, xRy, which pplies to all dual relations but mentions no particular terms or rela- ons. All that remains is the form, that in a proposition which emains unchanged when every constituent of the proposition is placed by another."[68] These forms are the concern of logic, and orm is the same as constant or function. Pure science, then, is e science of the functions of propositions.

Here we first meet the theory of external relations. The old logic ad supposed that all propositions were reducible to one form, the ubject-predicate type, but that was merely a faulty inference from e inaccuracies of vocabulary and syntax. For all words are of the ame logical type (substance), but their meanings are not of the ame type. Hence we cannot substitute any word for any other nd still make sense. Substance-words differ from attribute-words nd relation-words in that the latter suggest structure. Thus the former can be named and symbolized simply as x, but the others must be symbolized by structure. E.g., the symbol for "yellow" is not just that word but "x is yellow" (xa); the symbol for "pre- cedes" is not just that word but "x precedes y" (xRy). Hence the doctrine of external relations states primarily

> . . . that a relational proposition is not, in general, logically equivalent . . . to one or more subject-predicate propositions. Stated more precisely: Given a relational propositional function "xRy," it is not in general the case that we can find predicates a, b, c, such that, for all values of x and y, xRy is equivalent to xa, yb, (x, y) c, [where (x, y) stands for the whole consisting of (x and y)], or to any one or two of these.[69]

We must see how this theory of propositions applies in science, for it is the primary task of the logician to construct functions interpreting the data supplied by the empirical sciences. Here Russell's

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 75. Cf. also pp. 69, 110-12; *Contemporary British Philosophy*, pp. 361-62; *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1920), pp. 196-204.
[68] *Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 199.
[69] *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 373.

principle of economy is central. "Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities."[70]

The possibility of making such constructions depends on a fairly well developed empirical science, for the logician must know what he is to construct. And the things to be constructed are always entities which various sciences postulate as the support or constituents of the known entities with which they deal, e.g., space, time, matter, the subject in knowledge, etc. The body of propositions dealing with these entities constitutes, we may say, the rules of the game.

> Given a set of propositions dealing nominally with the supposed entities, we observe the properties which are required of the supposed entities in order to make the propositions true. By dint of a little logical ingenuity, we then construct some logical function of less hypothetical entities which has the requisite properties. The constructed function we substitute for the supposed inferred entities, and thereby obtain a new and less doubtful interpretation of the body of propositions in question.[71]

We come to a critical point when we ask what entities can be observed and known. Russell holds that there are certain objects with which we are "acquainted," and this means "directly aware of" to the exclusion of inference or mere description. These objects are of two types, particulars and universals. Particulars are the objects of sense such as particular colors, sounds, and internal states of feeling. Universals are such objects as "yellow," "blue," "human," etc., of which we are aware after having seen a number of particular "yellows," etc.

Among these universals are relations of which we must suppose that we know the universal meaning and not merely the instances. For, as we have seen, in analysing a relational proposition, we resolve it into two (or more) terms and a relation; but if we did not know the meaning of all the constituents, we could not know the meaning of the complex.[72]

All other supposed objects are either inferred entities or logical constructions and are objects of description. But if we are to understand the meaning of propositions, all its constituents must be reducible to objects with which we are acquainted.[73] Hence in doing away with inferred entities we must form our logical constructions out of sense data and universals. All the constituents will then be known and the propositions in which the functions are used will be meaningful.

For instance, in physics, whose ultimate constituents are sense data, we can eliminate the persistent "things" of common sense. There

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[70] *Ibid.*, p. 363.
[71] *Mysticism*, p. 156.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 209 ff.
[73] Cf. *Mathematical Philosophy*, chaps. xvi and xvii; *Mysticism*, p. 219; *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Norgate, 1912), chap. v.

is no evidence that sense data persist, nor that time and space are single, continuous entities. We can interpret sense data as consisting of time and space corpuscles. A series or class of these makes up the "individual thing" of common sense. The particulars thus arranged in wholes or classes are logical fictions, or, in other words, they are functions to which we give a name. The pattern which they make is due to the relations among them, but they are to be conceived as arranged, not like bricks in a building, but like notes in a symphony, i.e., the particulars are not persisting but passing.

"Cause" is another concept which should be eliminated. The supposed cause is merely a correlation of antecedents or "compresents" with a given sense datum; it is a mathematical function exhibiting the constant relation among a certain group of variables and constructed on the basis of empirical evidence such as regularity and the constant conjunction of sense data.[74]

In this work of analysis and construction logic is the servant of the empirical sciences. But Russell also grants philosophy a synthetic task. Philosophers should attempt to work out the relations between the sciences, to resolve conflicts, and to propose hypotheses as to the possible structure of the universe. His own views of the universe are always proposed as hypotheses, i.e., as logically possible (the antinomies are resolved) and empirically probable. But even here logic must accept the data of the empirical sciences; and since these are liable to yield new data and change direction, the philosopher should always be ready to supply new hypotheses to systematize the data. Therefore he says that logic by itself can decide nothing about the nature of relations, and his own position is taken on empirical grounds.[75]

Yet it is clear that his physical and logical atomism depend on his conception of the nature of pure mathematics. With that ideal in view he built the theory of knowledge and being which supports it and from which his theory of relation follows. Like Hume he holds that all distinct objects of immediate knowledge are separate existents, but he adds to the Humean data certain universals and relations. Thus relations become separate entities, external to the terms, and, like mathematical symbols, capable of being moved about without alteration either in the nature of the terms or of the relations.

However, in his theory, relations in their universal significance are not mental products. He holds a dualism of subject and object and says that universals and relations are objects discovered, not made, through the relation of "acquaintance." With the new realists he often calls them "neutral entities" which do not exist, but "subsist," and he compares them to the Platonic ideas. Yet relations retain their

[74] *Mysticism*, Essays VII-IX.
[75] *Contemporary British Philosophy*, pp. 377-82.

character as independent "particulars" which are not discovered as parts of, or necessarily connected with, any special terms; hence, the actual positing of *this* relation between *these* terms in the building of the system, is a logical activity with an empirical basis, e.g., regular sequence for the causal relation. Relations neither derive from any necessity of natures nor do they impose necessity on things; they can always be analysed out and separated from their terms—they are *ab extrinseco.*

With Kant he holds that the common sense "things" are subjective constructions. For Kant the forms of the constructs were a priori and necessary; but for Russell the form itself is empirically suggested, the relations are among the "given," and there is only a hypothetical necessity deriving from postulates which, like Kant's transcendental ideas, are useful for the guidance and unification of science.

What, then, is the judgment which, in Thomism, is supposed to be concerned with the *esse* of things? Russell says that the "is" of the proposition has no existential signification; it indicates merely the form of the proposition. In "John is human," "is" indicates the subject-attribute form (xa); in "Socrates was before Aristotle," "was" indicates the relational form (xRy).[76] The judgment is a subjective synthesis of matter (objects of acquaintance) and form (functions).

As to the meaning of "exist" and "existence," he says it is meaningless to ask whether objects of acquaintance exist. There they are and that ends the matter. Existence here, then, is simply the clear and distinct presentation of the object, or, as Hume said, the clear conception of the object is proof of its reality. But there is sense in asking whether a "description" exists. A description is a logical construct, and to ask if it exists is to ask if there is a particular which this description describes. In other words, it is to ask whether this function is empirically verifiable, or, as Kant put it, existence is the possibility of verifying or applying a category through sensible intuition.[77]

In Russell the traditional nominalism comes strikingly to the surface. The real is the particular, the unanalysable and indefinable presented datum. Classes, natures, essences, even individuals are logical fictions with names, and these fictions, arranged in materially implicative propositions, constitute the object of science. Science deals with the real only in the sense that some of these fictions are shown to be functions of (Occam would say "stand for") sense data.

But that is all that Russell asks; the purpose of his logic is to show that contemporary empirical science may be true, i.e., that a

[76] *Mathematical Philosophy,* p. 200.

[77] *Ibid.,* pp. 164-65, 171-72, 177; *Mysticism,* pp. 174-76; *Contemporary British Philosophy,* p. 365.

pure, hypothetical, reductive system may be built on it. If Kant erected a theory of knowledge to justify Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics with their absolute and continuous time and space, Russell has built a logical system to support non-Euclidean geometry and relativity and quantum physics. Both strip science of contact with real beings, absolutes; they leave only a science of forms, a system of subjectively constructed relations. And in doing this they exclude any other type of scientific knowledge because their nominalist and empiricist presuppositions forbid the acknowledgment of any data proper to a genuine philosophy of nature and to metaphysics.

These theories of relation leave to the philosopher who wishes to understand nature a hard choice. They present a dilemma of absolute monism, necessity, and internality, or of complete pluralism, contingency, and externality; one dissolves the contingent and external many into appearance, while the other accepts these as real but leaves to science the construction of an unreal unity. Although they lead to opposites, both are based on epistemological and metaphysical positions which are very similar, and in their roots identical. But there is a middle way, and St. Thomas followed it, not because it was the middle, but because it is true. He saw that relations are both internal and external and in this found a notion of order which is very near the heart of his philosophy, one which permits a harmony of contingency and necessity and of unity and plurality.[78] But his theory too is intelligible only in the light of his epistemology and metaphysics.

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[78] Cf. *ST*, I, 86. 3c: ". . . nihil enim est adeo contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat." And 47. 3c: "Mundus enim iste unus dicitur unitate ordinis, secundum quod quaedam ad alia ordinantur."

PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENCE AND POSITIVE RELIGION

NONE OF the changes to be brought about in German philosophy by the conclusion of the war will be more far-reaching than that which philosophy of existence will presumably undergo. By its deliberately close association with actual affairs, this current of thought will be deeply affected by the turn of events. Although Alfred Rosenberg formulated the official statement of the Nazi "cultural and philosophical line" designed for popular propaganda purposes, an academically respectable and hence far more formidable preparation of the German mind was made by certain existentialists. Both as an articulate expression of contemporary moods and as a powerful factor in rendering acceptable the Nazi emphasis upon the community as the norm of law and action, heroic secular sacrifice, and impending death, existentialism contributed heavily to the disaster which has been visited upon Germany. Its implication is so thorough-going that doubt may even arise as to whether a once so modish and immediate viewpoint can survive under radically altered circumstances.

That philosophy of existence under some form will continue to be the leading school in Germany seems more probable to me than that it will disappear along with the swastika and the concentration camp. What the Germans themselves are wont to call *die deutsche Krankheit* is much too serious and deep-rooted a malady to be removed by the fortunes of war, by a change in governmental and economic structure, or even by the kind of educational program which we have planned. The brand of philosophy which was popular in Germany during the pre-war years did have a grain of truth which has prepared people there more effectively for a situation of death, defeat, and stubborn reconstruction than has our reigning naturalism prepared us for the healing and re-forming mission that we have set out upon. The darker, more pessimistic tones of existentialism may well seem closer conformed to reality and more capable of providing a solid basis for a renewed national life. Moreover, the major sources of inspiration for this philosophy—Kierkegaard and Nietzsche—are far enough removed in time to be independent of passing political support, and sufficiently equivocal in statement to permit new interpretations. Whatever the fate of Heidegger and Heyse, it is not likely that non-Nazi thinkers like

Karl Jaspers and the Christian existentialists will lose influence during the coming years. These latter groups also enjoy the advantage over refugee philosophers of having remained and shared the common destiny of their countrymen. They may rightly be expected to retain a leading place in post-war German intellectual life.

The most important problem now confronting philosophy of existence is the position which it will take concerning religion. In countries other than Germany, philosophers of an existential inclination have not shown an anti-Christian or antireligious bias. And in Germany itself, neither the tragic atheism of Heidegger nor the artificially cultivated paganism of Rosenberg has proved a satisfactory solution. Karl Jaspers has repudiated the total immanence of the former, and is completely unsympathetic towards the latter's virulent racism. He has not yet set forth systematically his own views on the problem of religion, restricting himself to incidental references and to the study of certain particular difficulties which have been proposed to him in this regard. From his general position and from these fugitive passages, however, a sufficiently definite account of Jaspers' doctrine can be gathered.[1]

I. THE KINDS OF PHILOSOPHIZING

Jaspers offers a vigorously activist conception of philosophy as an act and process of philosophizing, rather than as a doctrinal content of objectively ascertainable truth. Hence the *attitude* of the philosopher is of primary importance in determining his world view. Although this notion accords well with the studies made by Jaspers in his remarkable *Psychology of World-Views* (1919), he does not allow that it portends a return to that psychologism which Edmund Husserl criticized so brilliantly at the beginning of the present century. Far from wishing to reduce properly philosophical concepts to their counterparts in human imagery, Jaspers makes extensive use of concrete analyses only as *une traversée du psychologique* in order to render possible existence more intensely present in thought.[2] Like all philosophers, he is in search of principles; but these principles are sought by him primarily in the human existing subject taken concretely and comprehensively. Thus the inquiry into being and existence has a distintively modern orientation: I inquire after the origins of being by inspecting my own situation in the world wherein I am placed, by recognizing myself as an existent, and by directing my being towards transcendence.

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[1] The present paper continues an investigation begun in "An Approach to Karl Jaspers, "*Thought,* Vol. XX (1945). For a philosophical discussion of the German educational problem, cf. M. Beck, "Notes on the Re-education of Germany," *Harvard Educational Review,* XV (1945), 226-29.

[2] "Subjectivité et transcendance," *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie, XXXVII* (1937), 197.

In this concise formula is contained the principle for a threefold division of philosophy into *Weltorientierung, Existenzerhellung,* and *Metaphysik.* These are the sub-titles of the three volumes of Jaspers' chief work *Philosophy* (1932), each volume of which deals with the special problems met with in that respective phase of the philosophical enterprise. Since religion is sharply contrasted with philosophy at all points, an appreciation of Jaspers' stand on positive religion supposes a general acquaintance with his teaching on the ways of philosophizing. In an introductory chapter to the most comprehensive statement of his position, Jaspers himself provides us with a summary account of philosophy of existence.[3]

A. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION IN THE WORLD

Contemporary philosophy has witnessed a remarkable revival of interest in the notion of "the world." In Heidegger's system, being can be understood in no other way than as man's "being-in-the-world." This equivalence is vigorously contested by Jaspers, who rightly denies the absolute nature of the being which is empirically present *(Dasein)* in the world. Philosophy only begins, indeed, when the closed and sufficient version of nature is seen to involve our thought in hopeless antinomies culminating in the radically opposed positivist and idealist interpretations of the world. Neither view is capable of grasping nature in its totality, since a comprehensive understanding of nature is impossible on a completely immanent basis.

In the prephilosophical investigation of the world, we can distinguish between empirical individual reflectiveness and the generalized theories offered by the various sciences. Being is even here the primary goal of thought, although it can be approached only under its many particular and factual surrogates. It is evident that the three poles of empirical being are: object, self or subject, and being considered in itself as a limit rather than as an appearance for a knower. Consciousness is the common ground uniting these various perspectives on reality, since things *are* for me only as they are present to me as objects of consciousness. On this level, the analysis of being is held to be identical with the analysis of consciousness. The latter can be considered factually and historically as a mode of a self which experiences and lives in time and memory. Or it may be treated in a more logical fashion as a mode of intentionality directed to objects. Both the naïve attitude and the sciences of psychology and anthropology treat being in terms of individual factual consciousness. The human self is regarded as one object among others, being composed of vital principle and body, and subject to passing emotions, thoughts, and the permanent dread of death as the end of man. Although this standpoint yields valuable insights,

[3] *Philosophie* (3 vols.; Berlin, 1932), I, 1-58.

Jaspers could not admit the questionable claims now being made in America by E. Hooton, M. Mead, and others for cultural and physical anthropology as the science of man *tout court.*

Room must also be allowed for logic in the broader post-Kantian sense, in which transcendental consciousness figures as a generalized self identical throughout all time and in every empirical subject. The logical concept of consciousness-in-general is foreshadowed by the transformation, which the sciences make, of private empirical worlds into a single objective world of experience publicly accessible to all minds. From this standpoint, being can be considered as the object of consciousness-in-general and hence as the objectively knowable world. The perspectives of the various sciences are then united in an attempt to formulate a single world view. This philosophical orientation supposes that the totality of being is somehow at hand (whether by creation or by mechanistic evolution) to be inspected and comprehended by reason. Being is hence identified with whatever is objective and *wissbar.* But to equate *Sein* and *Objektsein* is to absolutize reason and its categories, since being is an object only as it is being for a rational subject. A final consequence of the direction of reason to the given world is the emphasis placed upon temporal duration as an index of power, upon mass social processes at the expense of individual endeavor, and upon the objective causal sequence as implying universal determinism.

B. THE ILLUMINATION OF EXISTENCE

It is a fundamental conviction of Jaspers that the comprehensiveness of the world of empirical being is an illusion. The first indication of the deceptiveness of its claim to completeness is seen in the inability of reason to arrive at a single universally-accepted systematic account of the world. Since the Renaissance and more especially since Kant, we have become familiar with the comparison between the unity and unilinear progress of the sciences and the scandalous conflicts transpiring in the ranks of philosophy. Although we can today no longer admit the mere appeal to the unity of science, still the sharp antagonism between positivistic and idealistic philosophies is too apparent to be denied. Attempts have been made to overcome this opposition on the basis of an immanent philosophy which would combine the best features of the scientific basis of positivism with the other values represented by idealism.[4] But even from their common fund of doctrine there cannot be constructed an

[4] Recent American naturalism is one such attempt at synthesis. "Contemporary naturalism thus represents at once the culmination of the idealistic criticism, and of the natural sciences of men and human culture" (J. Randall, "Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism," the summarizing essay in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* a symposium ed. by Y. Krikorian [New York, 1944], p. 373).

adequate philosophy of man, since they rely too completely upon the univocal methodology of the sciences. The categories proposed by these sciences are, indeed, modes of thought and being, but they are only modes of being considered as an object and hence as constituting a world. The being which is directly present in the world can be ascertained through the categories, but they are inadequate to the task of grasping those areas of being which are only indirectly revealed in the world. Hence Jaspers is careful to distinguish between ontology (as the science of categorial being) and metaphysics (as the search for the being of transcendence).

The naturalistic explanation breaks down when it seeks to explain the human individual. No man's secret is wholly surrendered when he is defined as one instance in a kind, one more product in nature's amazingly fecund and varieted development. This he knows himself to be, and yet to be only in so far as he can be included as an object in the world or as the world's correlative subject. That this does not exhaust what he is, appears from what a man can become. He can, first of all, become aware of what it means to have empirical being in the world. This is to become aware that mundane being is always being-in-a-situation, a limited and circumscribed mode which can be modified by entering another situation, but from which there is no definitive escape within the world. The realization of a man's general condition as one of being imbedded in situation is simultaneously the first step in his release from this bondage. For a man is never finally and completely determined to any situation, even to the ultimate one of facing inevitable death. What Heidegger forgets is that the most relevant factor in the *human* approach to death or to any other *Grenzsituation* is always adopted by a man rather than imposed upon him. This recognition of his situation and his freedom elevates man from merely empirical being to the state of existence proper *(Existenz)*.

Existence, Jaspers maintains, can never become the object of investigation, for it is rather the unconditioned source from which philosophizing rises. But we can at least detect possible existence from what man exhibits as enduring through time: his fidelity to actions in the past, his foresight and planning in the face of future possibility, and above all his imperious sense of the present as a call for decision. Existence can be regarded as historical possibility only if it is recognized that the historical (as opposed to the zoological) self is constituted by a decision in time having significance for eternity. Kierkegaard's teaching on the instant as the point of intersection between time and eternity has had considerable influence upon Jaspers' notion of existence. But whereas the Danish philosopher considers eternity to be set over against time in a paradoxical relation, Jaspers prefers to regard eternity as the "depth" of time as the his-

torical appearance of existence. This follows from his important theory of the relation between the world and existence. Existence can have reality nowhere else than *in* the world, although it is not present there *as* objective world-being. Existence cannot be understood from the viewpoint of the world, since the latter incorrigibly regards every appearance in it as an instance of empirical being. But conversely, since existence makes its appearance only in the order of empirical being, it regards any form of *Dasein* as genuine only as exhibiting existence. A consequence of critical importance for all theory of religion is that any purported existence apart from the world must be treated as unauthentic.

Philosophy, however, cannot take existence to be absolute being, any more than it can so take the world. If the human self cannot be deduced from the world as a mere consequence, neither can this existing self pretend to be the source from which the world is derived. Existence is not the unqualified being, but must remain forever unenclosed, incomplete, and in relation to the Other. This openness to transcendence is basic to philosophy of existence, setting it off from naturalism and from the "existential" immanence of Martin Heidegger. The study of the problems centering about transcendence is the task of the highest phase of philosophy of existence: metaphysics.

C. METAPHYSICS

In casting light upon human existence, we become involved in an inquiry into origins and unconditioned modes of being. The Cartesian standard of clarity and distinctness must be abandoned in this province, for such a criterion is valid only in the sphere of direct acquaintance modelled upon the prototype of the *Cogito*. Existence, on the contrary, can never be approached directly, but must be interrogated in retrospect and prospect through examining the enigmatic signs provided by critical human situations. Like Peter Wust, Jaspers finds that the awareness of human existence arises when a man has been shaken in his specious *securitas* as a part of massive nature. The restlessness which passes over a man when he considers his own transitoriness in the world leads him to assert what is unique and free in himself. He attempts to go beyond the duality of subject/object to an originary state free from all conditions of objectivity.[5] Thus existence not only remains open, but also seeks to orientate itself positively in the direction of transcendence.

[5] This aspect of transcendence corresponds to Kant's doctrine of the unity of apperception which, at least in the *Opus Postumum*, is constitutive of both subject and object. Jaspers himself is careful to note the difficulty involved in applying *unity* (a category for Kant) to apperception (which is supra-categorial). Kent himself glosses over this point by simply declaring this unity to be some higher than the category of unity—presumably a qualitative

For metaphysics, all reality somehow bespeaks the presence of the Other, which can be identified neither with empirical being nor with existence itself. These latter spheres of reality, however, serve as symbols and ciphers of transcendence, and we are required to decode the message which we think them to convey. In retrospect, philosophy is seen to be nothing but a continued essay in transcendence. The various modes of transcending provide us with the principle of division of the branches of philosophy, supplanting the Aristotelian division based upon the kinds of objects under investigation. Without depreciating or forsaking the world, philosophy uncovers the insufficiency of the scientific outlook and the essential limitation of empirical being. Its first function, then, is to open up and explore the possibility of surpassing the world and the objective categories of being. Philosophy does this by directing attention upon the individual exister, in the pregnant Kierkegaardian sense, the self which is an individual beyond all general categories. Existence is approached indirectly by a study of man's historical nature, the communication of selves, the sense of freedom, and the limit-situations (death, suffering, struggle, guilt). These latter carry full meaning only when human existence is related at least intentionally to transcendence.

Metaphysics seeks being as one, and hence as beyond the multiplicity present in the world and in existence. The metaphysician can say that transcendence does *not* lie in existence, that it is *not* relative or finite or mutable. But the method of negation in Jaspers' hands does not give place ultimately to a *via eminentiae,* as it does in the Scholastic treatment of the "divine names." The movement towards transcendence is frustrated at every point in philosophy of existence. Owing to their equivocal signification, the ciphers upon which metaphysics must exercise its hermeneutic function refuse to give up their message. Their code remains forever unbroken and inscrutable. Our efforts at making the signs intelligible end in inevitable paradox and circular reasoning. The reality of the transcendent cannot present itself to us, for nothing seems real to us except in the context of empirical being. No knowledge is gained in the search which existence makes for transcendence. Not cognitive acquaintance with the transcendent, but the attitude of transcending is acquired in the attempt at *Chiffrelesen.* The failure of thought is itself the deepest message conveyed by the ciphers of human existence. With a new-found freedom from the limits and concerns of the world, the self nevertheless returns to the world in peace. The

unity. Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 131 (English trans. by N. K. Smith [New York, 1933], p. 152); B 114-15 (pp. 118-19). But *qualitative* unity still remains within the categorial order, unless the transcendentals are allowed to be more than logical criteria of the possibility of knowledge in general.

Absolute is not denied. But although we may make room for it in our existence, we can never appropriate it authentically. Jaspers concludes that it is the part of wisdom to accept this our human situation.

II. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The observations upon religion which Jaspers has made from the vantage point of the philosophy of existence are marked both by obscurity and by frankness. The obscurity in his position is due partly to the incidental nature and brevity of his statements, and partly to the habitual caution with which he guards all references to contemporary issues. Because of certain similarities between his theory of transcendence and Karl Barth's doctrine of the utter unlikeness of God and creatures, a claim has been made concerning the influence of dialectical theology upon the formation of Jaspers' thought. Doubtless there are residual traces of the Protestant conception of religion in Jaspers, but they have been blended with a strangely incongruous freethinking scientism, reminiscent of the nineteenth-century positivism in which he was trained and which he has not completely overcome. According to his own statement, dialectical theology is, on the contrary, dependent upon philosophy for many of its leading theses.[6] Yet Jaspers did not undertake any extended discussion of religion in his main work, a lacuna which has permitted many misunderstandings to arise concerning the treatment which he did accord to this question. In the closing pages of two later books, he has attempted to clear up some of the difficulties and to make his own position unmistakable.[7]

Jaspers frankly admits that his approach to religion is made "from the outside." Although he does not allow the final validity of any philosophical position which is *standpunktlich,* still he recognizes that his report on religion is made from the standpoint of philosophy, and consequently that he may be doing unintended injustice to the religious way. We shall see that this is the case, indeed, but the shortcomings should be attributed more to Jaspers' theoretical presuppositions than to antireligious bias. For confirmation of his views, Jaspers relies mainly upon his own psychological studies of religious and mystical personalities, as well as upon Kant, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. These sources constitute both the strength and the weakness of his account, although his reliance upon them is never a servile one. Comparison between Jaspers' doctrine and those of his great predecessors will enable us to appreciate the value and limitations of this application of philosophy of existence.

[6] *Vernunft und Existenz* (Groningen, 1935), p. 108.

[7] The main passages occur in: *Philosophie,* I, 294-317; II, 314-28; III, 164-68; *Vernunft und Existenz,* pp. 101-8; *Existenzphilosophie* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 71-85.

Religion, for Jaspers, is always positive and independent of philosophy. It is positive in the sense of claiming to be based upon a definite act or teaching of the transcendent, and in actual practice Christian revelation is taken as prototypical in positive religion. In this way, Jaspers avoids the problem raised by Kierkegaard concerning the transition from "religiousness *A* to religiousness *B*," from natural religions to the supernatural religion. This simplification is achieved, however, at the high cost of eliminating every philosophical justification and natural basis for religion. The distinction between philosophy and religion is unwarrantedly extended into complete separation and antagonism. Hence the provisional independence granted to religion is required by the completely areligious nature of philosophy, which can neither include nor warrant a doctrine of the transcendent. Just as Kant accorded to metaphysics a *de facto* status as an actual and, indeed, ineradicable condition of human nature, so does philosophy of existence allow that positive religion is a most powerful force in human existence, enjoying a reality of its own, which philosophy of existence does not wish to supplant.[8] The claims of religion are not to be attacked frontally by philosophy, but the latter must ever retain an open and questioning attitude in the face of every profession of absolute truth.

Taken simply as one of the major factors in our historical culture, belief in the transcendent is even regarded by Jaspers as a major "material" source and stimulant for philosophy of existence. The latter discipline benefits by religious teaching in a manner conformable to the general progress of metaphysics. Certitude is not to be expected in metaphysics, but its very inconclusiveness enables it to avoid narrow standpoints and rigid positions. In Jaspers' estimation, metaphysics is characterized by *Schwebe* and *Spiel*, but the game is one played in earnest, in view of what is at stake. What elevates man above the state of pure facticity is his persistent quest for transcendence. In furtherance of this pursuit, the metaphysician must take account not only of various formal theories of being as immanent or transcendent, but also of the two major sources from the side of the transcendent itself: myth and revelation. Both are voices of the transcendent in the world. From myth, art, and poetry, metaphysics draws valuable hints about the creative power of the transcendent. And the content of revelation furnishes man with a goad, pricking him on to look beyond the requirements of daily life to the fundamental issues of guilt, death, and the salvation of the soul. Without this constant witness to an order of being beyond the empirical world, the desire for transcendence would arise but seldom in man's thought and action.

[8] *Existenzphilosophie*, pp. 79, 82.

Metaphysics as a search for absolute origins must ultimately, however, provide the elements of myth rather than of knowledge about the transcendent.[9] No matter how penetrating and closely reasoned the theories of absolute being, they represent only *possible* explanations, none of which carry a coercive force. Philosophy can legitimately treat only of the human attitude of transcending, never of the nature of subsisting being considered absolutely. The great stress which Kant placed upon the antinomic nature of thought when directed upon metasensible objects has not spent its force in contemporary thought. It led Nicolai Hartmann to maintain the problematicity and fundamental irrationality of the real,[10] and it led Jaspers to reinstate the Kantian distinctions between the transcendent and the transcendental, as well as between knowing an object and thinking about it. However much the metaphysician may profit by the presence of religious belief, he can never incorporate its content or attitude as a part of philosophy. On this score, Jaspers fears unduly that if an absolute character be granted to positive religion, then every philosophical truth must be relativized. This would follow only if philosophical reason could in no way arrive at genuine knowledge of the unconditioned being. But if a minimal natural knowledge and religious service of God is granted, then the relation of positive religion to philosophy and natural piety can be taken as one of completion, confirmation, and perfecting elevation.

Jaspers is unwilling, in any case, to provide a complete present-day counterpart of *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.* Kant defined religion, subjectively regarded, as the recognition of all duties as divine commands, and objectively as the laws or practical principles of whose unconditioned necessity we can become aware through pure practical reason. For him, the religious attitude requires only problematic belief in the mere idea of God as a possible existent, together with a strong moral sense of our responsibility to comply with *all* our moral duties, no special religious service being reserved for God.[11] Although admitting the bare possibility of the supernatural as a transcendent (and hence problematic) concept, Kant would deistically reduce the specific content of religion as an actual power to morality, and hence to philosophy itself in its practical moment. Hence, in his little-known prize essay on *The Real Progress of Metaphysics,* he does not hesitate to call transcendental philosophy in its final practical or moral phase "a practical dogmatism or theology" which sums up the religious man's *Credo* in

[9] *Philosophie,* I, 58.

[10] For a criticism of this view, cf. my study "The Neo-Scholastic Critique of Nicolai Hartmann," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* VI (1945-46), 122-23.

[11] *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,* English trans. by T. Greene and H. Hudson (Chicago, 1934), pp. 142, 156, 179.

the free postulates of moral faith as determined by practical reason.[12] But Jaspers' tendency is to keep the realms of religion and philosophy completely apart, in accordance with his more psychological and historical approach to the irreducible structure of religious faith. This results in a corresponding weakening of the specifically moral sections in philosophy of existence. Although his entire treatment is suffused with a tone of moral earnestness and although traditionally moral matters such as suicide and guilt are included, morality finds no place in Jaspers apart from existential awareness. Although he follows Kierkegaard in his account of the first "stage in life's way" as the esthetic or spectator-attitude towards the world and one's life, Jaspers concentrates in the single order of philosophical existence as ordered to transcendence the entire range of values which his Danish predecessor assigned to the ethical and the existential-religious spheres. He refuses to grant to the religious outlook the unique features which for Kierkegaard made it the only authentic state for the truly *existing* individual. Religion remains for Jaspers quite apart from genuine human interests, in spite of its acknowledged influence upon our lives.

At first sight, this policy of isolation seems to be incompatible even with the main lines of Jaspers' own system, since both philosophy and religion join in championing the rights of transcendence against every exclusively *diesseitig* philosophy. Hence they take a common stand against the pseudo-transcendence of Heidegger, for whom transcendence can mean nothing more than an individual's recognition of his intentional direction towards the world which encompasses him. That there can be any other being than that which is presented as the world is denied by Heidegger, who maintains the total immanence of man in the world without any possibility of relating himself in the direction of true transcendence. Beyond the world is only the impending nought, wherein man can find no stable supramundane foundation. Philosophy of existence challenges this view on the ground that it is valid only for reason which, as consciousness-in-general, is directed exclusively to the world. Existence, however, is based upon a philosophical faith that goes beyond knowledge and empirical being through a decisive leap of personal decision.[13] This faith urges us to make a twofold option, one of which would place us in opposition to Heidegger, the other to religious faith. It asks us, first, to choose between a world taken as complete in itself and one where man is located at a median point be-

[12] *Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibniz'ens und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?* Vol. VIII, *Werke*, ed. E. Cassirer (11 vols.; Berlin, 1922-23), pp. 262, 282.

[13] On *Glaubensgewissheit* and *Glaubenssprung* in Jaspers, cf. J. Pfeiffer, *Existenzphilosophie: Eine Einführung in Heidegger und Jaspers* (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 49-53.

tween the objective and the nonobjective orders of being. Then it demands a further decision concerning the nature of transcendence itself. Is transcendence to be realized in the world, or is the world to be forsaken in a fatuous quest for a subsisting being beyond it?[14] Philosophical faith takes the former path, religious faith the latter.

In coming to the central thesis of Jaspers' critique of positive religion, it is well to bear in mind Joseph Geyser's remark that Kant's criticism of metaphysics stands and falls with the justice of his declarations on the nature of knowledge.[15] Like Kant, Jaspers supposes that if there is no adequate direct or intuitive knowledge of the transcendent, there is no knowledge of it at all possible. But whereas Kant expressed himself in openly noetic terms, Jaspers argues somewhat deceptively by reference to the modes of being. The world, existence, and transcendence are for him inseparable and stand in mutual need. Transcendence is required lest the being of the existing self be lost in everyday pursuits, and lest the being of the world lose all depth as the field of endless possibilities for man's inquiring spirit. The *Erscheinungshaftigkeit* of empirical being and of all our thinking is first exposed by transcendence, which views all empirical being, thought, and existential situations as so many signs of unconditioned being. But Jaspers also holds that, conversely, transcendence is valid only in and for human existence, since it furnishes us with no real communion with the transcendent being. The philosophical significance of transcendence lies exclusively in the changed attitude which it brings about in man. He is endowed with a dominating freedom in the midst of mundane concerns, and is led to the borderline between the objective and the nonobjective where genuine existence is located. No real being can be ascribed by us to the transcendent, although we conceive it to be a unique, fully actual, and unconditional reality beyond all possibility, change, and multiplicity. So considered, the transcendent is only a bare concept which involves metaphysics in endless contradictions.

That transcendence is only a mode of human existing and never the pathway to an absolute subsisting being follows for Jaspers from his limitation of all reality to a mundane framework. Being is real for us *only* when it makes its appearance in and as related to *Dasein*. Human freedom and existence have substance only when a man makes his decisions in the world and with reference to his situation in it. Thus the transcendence advocated by Jaspers, for all his opposition to Heidegger, remains an unfulfilled transcendence. Into Heidegger's world is brought the affirmation of a need for transcending and for maintaining an open attitude. But the hope of reaching the transcendent is never realized and is even declared to be unrealiz-

[14] *Existenzphilosophie,* pp. 70-71.
[15] *Einige Hauptprobleme der Metaphysik* (Freiburg i. B., 1923), p. 2.

able in principle. Man is given the heroic counsel to remain within his world of suffering and death and become resigned to the failure in which every attempt to reach an absolute being must end.[16] The pessimistic "passion to night" rules the universe of philosophy of existence.

Just as Kant restricted knowledge *(Erkenntnis)* to the experiential order constituted by sensibility and understanding, so Jaspers limits reality and knowledge of reality *(Wissen)* to the world of empirical being, in which alone existence can be developed. Both thinkers place at the base of human freedom a kind of moral faith or awareness of man's peculiar dignity and destiny, but this practical conviction does not strictly merit the name of knowledge. Speculative metaphysics cannot but end in failure for them on these presuppositions, for it cannot be gainsaid that we acquire no intuitive knowledge of God through philosophy. Yet they do not take account of a genuine but incomplete knowledge arrived at analogically in the effort to account completely for what experience does present to us. Jaspers' transposition of epistemological views into metaphysical terms does not strengthen the case against the possibility of our arriving at an unconditioned being through philosophical means. He himself admits that both the being of the world and that of existence bear the marks of their limited and nonabsolute nature, and that we can arrive at least at the conclusion "that" God exists.[17] Although Jaspers hastens to add that we cannot thereby learn anything about "what" God is, these admissions come remarkably close to the Scholastic teaching on the limitation of our knowledge of God. The very insufficiencies of empirical and existential being point as legible signs rather than as dumb ciphers to the unconditioned source of being. Although the essential being of God as it is in itself remains entirely apart from the world and unknown to us, it is not required for every kind of true knowledge of God that we know Him comprehensively or even essentially in His own mode of being. To know something about His essence, we need not know that essence in an intuitive gaze comparable to God's own essential self-knowledge. The "that" of God gives us some minimal knowledge of His "whatness," in so far as the derived being of the world and of existence does partake of being and so does convey some intelligible message about the unconditioned source of all being. The necessary grounding of human knowledge in empirical being should not be so construed as to involve us in an empirio-centric predicament which would confuse knowledge about the transcendent with transcendent knowledge.

[16] For a contrast between this and the Christian conception of man's vocation, cf. H. Rechtmann, "Das Menschenbild der Existenzphilosophie und der christliche Glaube," *Stimmen der Zeit,* CXXXVIII (1941), 177-82.

[17] *Philosophie,* III, 39.

Only by committing this fallacy can Jaspers banish metaphysical knowledge and, with it, the natural philosophical basis for religion.

It is noteworthy that the particular arguments brought by Jaspers against positive religion are more psychological than philosophical in nature. They stress the supposedly dire consequences of granting knowledge of the transcendent, rather than the direct issues at stake. Often they cannot be reconciled with his own previous statements. In most instances the standpoint of positive religion is misrepresented in order to fit it to the central claim that knowledge of *ipsum esse subsistens* would be inimical to human dignity and responsibility.

The attitude of transcendence is founded upon a threefold emphasis upon actuality, historicity, and unity. Jaspers acknowledges the importance of the Scholastic idea of God as *actus purus,* as the eternal source from which historical reality flows forth, and as a perfectly simple unity. But he maintains that on all three scores the religious desire for direct commerce with the transcendent tends to destroy the very notion of transcendence.[18] For he holds that religious belief must issue either in a wholesale flight from the world and from man's duties therein, or in an intolerant championing of an absolute standpoint against the convictions of the rest of mankind. Although it has been remarked that such a charge has the ring of old-fashioned polemics about it,[19] it nevertheless follows from Jaspers' philosophical principles. In his system, any affirmation of the transcendent necessarily entails an alienation from empirical being which thereby destroys existence and prevents communication between men.

A. ACTUALITY AND POSSIBILITY

A primary function of transcendence is to destroy the mechanistic completeness and sufficiency which nature presents to us from the positivistic and idealistic standpoints. By contrasting the world in its factual presence with the ideal of a completely actual reality, man at last makes available to himself the possibilities which are his to realize through free decisions. But the exercise of freedom must be directed to the world, since the transcendent admits of no possibility and hence of no scope for our free actions.

Yet even if this were granted in part, despair and alienation need not follow in a religious *ethos.* The performance of tasks in the world is only reinforced by being regarded as a duty owed ultimately to the author of the natural law. Recognition of God's subsistent reality only serves to strengthen and sanction man's mission in the world, a mission whose effectiveness is heightened by temporary

[18] *Existenzphilosophie,* pp. 73-78; *Philosophie,* III, 272.

[19] Cf. F. Imle, "Jaspers als Existenzphilosoph," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* L (1937), 248.

withdrawal and a constant attitude of redemptive involvement. In fully acknowledging his final end to be God, the religious man is not therefore led to renounce his freedom and his place in the world of becoming. Indeed, what we do achieve in the immanent order derives a new and sacral significance from being undertaken out of dedication to the transcendent.[20] The religious attitude of being in the world but not of it bears a closer affinity to Jaspers' notion of human existence than he is willing to admit. His studies of ascetic and mystical personalities do not seem to have included that final return upon the world as seen and loved now from God's "standpoint" which sets off a St. Francis of Assisi and a St. John of the Cross from all mere world-deniers. The duty of the Church to bring all things under the headship of Christ has been ignored by Jaspers, who has failed to distinguish between the various meanings of the word "world," as that term is employed by positive religion.

B. ETERNITY AND HISTORICITY

Jaspers has a favorite definition of existence as the mode of being constituted by a decision in time concerning man's eternal meaning. Here again it is implied that while the notion of eternity is necessary to rescue man from complete absorption in time, nevertheless eternity has reality only in and for man's existence. When divorced from human decisiveness, eternity becomes a superstition without content. Jaspers' teaching on historicity, although of critical importance for his philosophy, is obscurely stated, owing perhaps to the uncertain way in which Kierkegaard is balanced off against Hegel. There is evident here the increasingly acute problem facing thinkers who try to secularize concepts which were originally theological.[21] When the attempt is made to laicize notions like transcendence and eternity, the most important dimensions are neglected or mishandled.

Historicity is the awareness of the presence of the eternal in the instant as it appears in time. Philosophy of existence is not as definite in its positive formulations of this concept as in its negative warning that this eternal presence should not be confused with the Scholastic abstract universal or the concrete-universal of Hegel. The idealistic notion of the eternal is not sufficiently determinate and is arrived at in abstraction from human temporality. It is only

[20] This point has been developed by J. Lotz, "Die Transzendenz bei Jaspers und im Christentum," *Stimmen der Zeit,* CXXXVII (1939), 76. It is difficult to admit with Lotz that Jaspers intends religion to be an intermediate stage in the way to philosophy. The opposition between them is too great to admit such a passage, although Jaspers would allow that the very errors and consequences of positive religion can lead a man to philosophy.

[21] Jaspers acknowledges that there is a religious echo throughout his thought, and that without Christianity many of his special concepts would not have entered his mind *(Bulletin de la société française de philosophie,* XXXVII [1937], 196-97).

within concrete human existence in time that the eternal can make a real appearance as the *Einzig-Allgemeine,* a strictly ineffable union of the general and the particular. But the presence of the eternal is realized whenever a man becomes aware of the unconditioned import of his choice. Thus for Jaspers, all things are capable of being holy (i.e., can be taken by man to be ciphers of the Other), whereas no particular person, thing, or event may be accorded special sacral meaning. For this would result in the absolutizing of some moment in the historical by making it objective and universally valid for all men in all times.

This is the ground offered for rejecting the corner-stone of positive religion, the Incarnation. Here a particular event is absolutized and made a fixed object of knowledge by traditional authority, which declares belief in it to be essential for the salvation of all men. Historicity is thereby destroyed, according to Jaspers, since man loses all direct personal relations with the eternal, and time is reduced to a meaningless repetition of years.[22]

Kierkegaard's anguished concern about "how to bridge the eighteen hundred years" is here swept aside by the expedient of denying the unique importance of the Incarnation and of our need to join somehow with it. Yet a simple inspection of the actual effect which belief in the Incarnation has had upon men's understanding of history is sufficient to expose the artificial nature of Jaspers' objections. Only with the Judaeo-Christian tradition did history become an irreversible process in which genuine issues are at stake and real loss or gain possible for men. Belief in the Incarnation was alone powerful enough to liberate human thinking from the theory of everlasting cyclic recurrence, and to give history dignity and meaningful orientation. The sense of release and jubilant freedom resounds through the patristic writings, culminating in the hammer-blows delivered in *The City of God* to the ancient tyranny of the eternal return of the same. What Nietzsche sought to revive when he deemed Christian belief to be dead is the real enemy of immediate and unique personal engagement in history. The Christian *pleroma,* far from rendering later times negligible, has endowed them with a point of reference, a direction and an eschatological hope for that consummation of history towards which each era and every individual therein makes an indispensable and unique contribution. This is the very stuff of historicity.[23]

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[22] *Philosophie,* II, 143. Cf. L. Jaspers, *Der Begriff der menschlichen Situation in der Existenzphilosophie von Karl Jaspers* (Würzburg, 1936), pp. 9-10. When Karl Jaspers writes of human independence and directness being lost by man's subsumption under "das Allgemeine einer einzigen Weltegeschichtlichkeit" *(Existenzphilosophie,* p. 73), he can only have in mind the interpretations of Christian dogma proposed by Hegel and Schelling.

[23] For a careful textual study supporting the general conclusions of Daw-

Further criticism of Jaspers' position on existence and historicity requires an understanding of his last major charge against positive religion, based upon the doctrine of unity and multiplicity. For in asserting that the Incarnation destroys man's direct relation to eternity, he fails to take into account that both the continuity of religious tradition and the personal "authoritative" dedication of the individual believer are required for understanding the situation of a man within positive religion.

C. UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY

The problem of the one and the many is for Jaspers, as for most philosophers, the central one in philosophy. Transcendence is the sphere of absolute unity, as it is the sphere of complete actuality. Only in the world is there found manyness and disparateness. Although things in the world can constitute a collection or aggregation, true community is found only among concrete persons. Communication is the mode of being that is peculiar to existence, since only here can personal dedication and mutual sharing transpire. Recalling that existence itself is essentially bound to the world of empirical being, the radical conclusion follows for Jaspers that God—not being *wirklich Daseinshaft*—could enter into no communication with men, even if His transcendent reality were established. "God does not speak to philosophers and contemplatives,"[24] is Jaspers' final verdict on the possibility of positive religion as a communion of God and men. God is unable to act directly in the world and can speak to men only obscurely and equivocally in *chiffres*. Indeed, because He is beyond existence and concrete determinations, God cannot be a person, but remains an inscrutable Other, a "that" with which a man cannot establish the required religious relation of Thou and I (to use the language of Ebner and Buber).

This conception of the divine nature is indispensable for weighing Jaspers' judgment upon positive religion. There is an (admitted) circular reasoning involved in denying God the power to work directly upon empirical being because He must speak in ciphers, and then in restricting His possible communication to "code signals" because of the impossibility of immediate divine causality. That personality and the ability to communicate with and act directly upon us are denied to God, supposes a more definite knowledge of His nature than Jaspers' general theory will permit. If such causality were impossible, there would indeed be no basis for analogical knowledge. But it involves no compromise of divine unity to relate

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son, Toynbee, Berdyaev, and Niebuhr, cf. A.-H. Chroust, "The Metaphysics of Time and History in Early Christian Thought," *New Scholasticism*, XIX (1945), 322-52; also cf. J. Guitton, *Le Temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et saint Augustin* (Paris, 1933).

[24] *Philosophie*, III, 327.

empirical manyness to this unity, nor does divine causality require that the unconditioned assume the conditions of empirical being. In order to establish the religious relation, however, it *is* necessary that the Other with which men are to be brought into communion be a person. Since the fullness of personality involves communication between like beings, Jaspers is led to deny personality to God, the absolutely Alone. But this same line of argument might rather lead us to conclude to the reasonableness of the belief in a Trinity of Persons in God.[25] The pure perfection of personality, and hence its applicability to God, is compatible with Jaspers' treatment of it as the highest form of actual perfection. It is only his special thesis about the necessarily mundane reference of every real perfection which prevents him from accepting a personal God.

Communication between us and the Incarnate Christ is also impossible according to philosophy of existence. We have seen the barriers which Jaspers professes to discover between a divine being as God and a human person. Yet Jaspers will allow Christ as man the power to establish relations only with His contemporaries, not with later generations. It is here that the demands of philosophy of existence could meet with success rather than failure if based upon a sound metaphysics and a less parochial view of positive religion. In the hypostatic union, we have the only way in which Jaspers' search for the eternal in time can be satisfactorily terminated and the only reality to which men of every age can relate themselves as to an eternal presence in time. Belief in a personal and incarnate God unites rather than separates men, since true community among men is based primarily upon their common relation to God. This holds not only of contemporaries, but also of the continuous generations of men. The doctrine of the Church as the *communio sanctorum,* the fellowship of God and men throughout time and to eternity, is lacking in Jaspers as it is lacking in Kierkegaard. Yet even on his own premises it is difficult not to grant true historicity to positive religion, since he does admit the latter to embody the only enduring tradition with which philosophy is bound in solidarity. Within neither tradition is communication between members to be denied, and religious community is based upon man's sharing in the life of the transcendent. The absolute unity of God does not isolate Him from us, but it does increase our solidarity with our fellows in proportion to our increase in likeness to Him.

There is no reason to suppose that Jaspers' philosophy has yet received its definitive formulation. Certainly, his views in religion have not been fully and finally elaborated. In their present form, they contain many penetrating insights as well as a good deal of

[25] Cf. F. Imle, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* L (1937), 251.

speculation which has little bearing on the actual content and practice of positive religion. From the present report it may be concluded that Jaspers would advance philosophy considerably if he were to make a direct reconsideration of Christian doctrine and religious life entirely apart from systematic requirements. If it were seen that the disastrous consequences said to follow from rational conviction about and religious belief in a transcendent being do not in fact follow, then a general revision of the doctrine on the modes of being in a less Kantian and psychiatric direction might be expected. Positive religion would then be appreciated as something more than a given factor in man's natural condition. Metaphysics would also profit by such a revaluation, since its final word would no longer be "failure."[26] In any case, it should be borne in mind that neither Heidegger nor Jaspers has exhausted the philosophical possibilities of the renewed contemporary interest in problems of existence. We have still to reckon with the "Christian existentialism" of Wust, Haecker, Guardini, and the enigmatic F. Ebner.

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[26] *Scheitern* has metaphysical value only when we learn to convert it into sacrifice and hence to detach ourselves even from the consolation which it affords to the Romantics; cf. L. Lavelle, *Le Moi et son destin* (Paris, 1936), pp. 116-17.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CONCEPT OF DREAD. By Sören Kierkegaard. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Walter Lowrie. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1944. Pp. xiii + 154. $2.00.

ATTACK UPON "CHRISTENDOM." By Sören Kierkegaard. Translated with an Introduction by Walter Lowrie. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1944. Pp. xviii + 303. $2.50.

FOR SELF-EXAMINATION AND JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES! AND THREE DISCOURSES 1851. By Sören Kierkegaard. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1944. Pp. vii + 243. $2.50.

TRAINING IN CHRISTIANITY AND THE EDIFYING DISCOURSE WHICH ACCOMPANIED IT. By Sören Kierkegaard. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Walter Lowrie. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1944. Pp. xxvii + 275. $3.00.

With these four volumes in print (the last two are American reprints of the Oxford edition) nearly all the works of Sören Kierkegaard are available in English. Dr. Lowrie has done about half of the twenty-four volumes of Kierkegaardian literature published in English during the past eight years. This is a remarkable accomplishment of translation and publication. Without the original works, and without a knowledge of Danish, I cannot judge how successful this work of translation has been. It was a difficult task and Lowrie's notes seem to justify his feeling that his translation is better, on the whole, than those already done into German, French, and Spanish.

A pastor in the Established Church of Denmark, Kierkegaard died in 1855. By temperament, he seems to have been morose, ironic, critical of everyone including himself, and pessimistic about the religious future of all mankind. By training, he became a well-read Biblical scholar, a capable student of classical Greek and Latin literature, and an existential philosopher. Most commentators agree that he knew the philosophy of Hegel better than any other —but he criticizes Hegel bitterly. Though his pessimism is often explained by reference to an early disappointment in love, it appears to me to have been a deep-rooted trait of personality. He wrote a great deal and is regarded as one of the molders, along with Ibsen, of the literary language of modern Denmark. Though his style of writing has been praised, we find Lowrie quoting with some approval a letter from a fellow translator (Dru): "One of these days I am going to say what I think of his [Kierkegaard's] vile, slovenly style, his clumsy, unnecessary terminology" *(Concept of Dread,* p. viii).

Of the four volumes listed above, only a small part is strictly philosophical. Kierkegaard is primarily a religious thinker. He has some affinities with the Gnostics, with the medieval German mystics (Eckhardt), with Boehme and Baader, with modern "crisis theologians," with N. Berdyayev, and more remotely with E. Przywara and M. Blondel. He is very critical of his own

church as a contemporary institution, of his fellow ministers, and of the whole system of state religion. Seemingly, Kierkegaard had a very exalted concept of what is to constitute the good Christian, and particularly the good Christian pastor. He speaks with irony of the pastor who is more concerned with the goods of this life than those of eternity. His admiration for clerical celibacy is one aspect of his thought which has caused Father Przywara to regard him as approaching Catholicism. I wonder, however, whether these thoughts on celibacy are based on truly religious motives or on the excessive individualism which characterizes his philosophy.

His philosophical views are best seen, if one is restricted to the above four volumes, in *The Concept of Dread.* (The other three works are devoted to religious polemic and meditation.) He takes the notion of dread (in Danish: *Angst)* and uses it as a sort of instrument with which to dissect the concept of original sin. This feeling of dread is pictured as being at the root of all sin. He seems to suggest that a man does not sin until he becomes afraid of sinning. There may be some psychological truth in this, but it modifies tremendously the Christian teaching on original sin. This sin becomes solely an affair of the spiritual existence of the individual man. We read, for instance: "The race has its history, and within it sinfulness has its continuous quantitative modification, but invariably innocence is lost only by the qualitative leap of the individual" *(Concept of Dread,* p. 34). As with all existential writers, I find myself asking: How does this man know these things and assert them so categorically?

Another point of view present in all four works, and generally typical of Kierkegaard's thought, is rationalism or anti-rationalism. I mean the frank rejection of reason as a mode of thinking logically about the universal. This is often implicit in criticism of Hegel and his *Logik*—but there is little doubt that all abstract thinking, all generalization is resented by Kierkegaard. This is most important for the understanding of his philosophy of religion. Despite his veneration for the spirit and eternity, he must have some difficulty with the Christian doctrine of charity. The communion of the saints, the Mystical Body of Christ, the universality of the Church—these Catholic concepts are impossible to a man whose only values are the concrete issues of the individual instant of spiritual life. Moreover, an irrationalist is a very hard man to understand. Kierkegaard complains frequently about being misunderstood, but I found tremendous satisfaction in Lowrie's admission in one of his notes, that "all this means very little to me" *(Concept of Dread,* p. 152).

Cognate with all this irrationalism is the contempt for method. Spurning textual scholarship and logic, Kierkegaard continually develops his argument by means of sweeping generalizations which are universal enough in logical form but which seem to rest merely on personal opinion. As an illustration we may point to this sort of statement: "Christianity has been *abolished* by *expanson,* by these millions of name-Christians, the number of which is surely meant to conceal the fact that there is not one Christian, that Christianity simply does not exist" *(Attack Upon Christendom,* p. 127). Where in the world, or out of it, did he get this fact? Understanding it merely as a rhetorical statement, what is its value? It suggests that Kierkegaard has a very idealized, perfectionistic concept of the true Christian and that few of his acquaintances approach this norm in their actual lives. But what argument can be founded on this sort of opinion?

Of the ancients, Socrates receives Kierkegaard's greatest respect. Of course, one of the attractions of the "Socratic legend" lies in the possibility of any man's making "Socrates" to his own image. It is the gadfly quality and the irony of Plato's mentor that Kierkegaard admires. The tremendous respect for reason, which some people find in the Socratic discourses, escapes Kierke-

gaard completely. That is why the last three works listed above often descend to personalities and petty criticisms of Danish officials, of the "Bishop," and the "Professor."

These books are important in contemporary philosophical literature. Kierkegaard exerted quite an influence on Harald Höffding, who was a capable historian of modern philosophy. Moreover, Kierkegaard now stands out as one of the first of the modern "existential" school. These books should be read by the scholar who wishes to have a specialized knowledge of the cross-currents of contemporary philosophy. He will find them far from the traditional current of Thomistic thought.

Vernon J. Bourke

St. Louis University

The Whole Man. By Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M. Cap. Bruce, Milwaukee, 1945. Pp. x + 687. $3.50.

Catholic colleges today need good textbooks in philosophy. One of the basic difficulties in the teaching of philosophy is the lack of textbooks which will inspire the students with the love of philosophy and develop in them an appreciation of metaphysics and the philosophical habit of mind. We have attempted to teach philosophy from textbooks which are not philosophical and do not inspire the students because they approach philosophy from a catechetical and dogmatic point of view. In certain isolated cases we have begun to remedy this deficiency, notably in Renard's *Philosophy of Being* and Brennan's *Thomistic Psychology*.

The minimum essentials for a good textbook in philosophy are (1) to present to the student the problems of philosophy and the philosophical method; (2) to form in the student the philosophical habit of mind; and (3) to introduce the student to the works of the great philosophers, especially of Aristotle, St. Thomas, and their contemporary successors Maritain, Gilson, Rousselot, Marechal, Garrigou-Lagrange, and others. Unless a textbook in philosophy accomplishes these minimum essentials, the book is a failure as a textbook and definitely should not be recommended because it perpetuates the intellectual mediocrity that has almost ruined Catholic philosophy in American colleges.

The present textbook in philosophy is a book that should be condemned because it does not fulfill the minimum essentials and deserves the justifiable criticism that of late years has been heaped upon textbooks. The present reviewer does not enjoy writing such an unfavorable review of a book, since he knows the amount of work that has gone into this book and appreciates the apostolic motive that urged Father Bittle to undertake the task of writing a book that required long and tedious hours of work. Yet the revival of interest in philosophy in American Catholic colleges and the intellectual development of American Catholicism will be handicapped if we allow such books to go uncondemned.

". . . [It] has been the endeavor of the author to use nontechnical language wherever possible and advisable . . ." (p. vi). A philosophy textbook must be written in technical philosophical language just as a mathematical textbook must be written in technical mathematical terms if the students are to learn either philosophy or mathematics.

The difference between experimental psychology and the philosophy of nature which treats of man is not merely that the latter "pushes its investigations still further into the regions of the unknown, thereby attempting to widen the boundary line of knowledge" (p. 4). The difference between the experimental sciences and philosophy is a difference based on the degrees of abstraction, the method of definition, and the method of argumentation. This difference has been fully discussed by contemporary Catholic philosophers,

notably by Maritain in his *The Degrees of Knowledge*, but the present book does not take into account this development in Catholic philosophy. We can no longer attempt to solve the problem of the difference between the natural sciences and philosophy by the Wolffian difference between proximate and ultimate causes (p. 4). Because the author does not clearly differentiate between the philosophical and the experimental scientific approach to the problem of man, he has attempted to combine in one book a course in experimental psychology and philosophical psychology. The combination is impossible from an educational point of view and merely obscures the philosophical value of the treatise on man.

In the method of presentation the author has deserted the thesis method in form, but his approach to the subject is still the same dogmatic approach. The philosophical method is the problem and question method which was used by both Aristotle and St. Thomas. Despite the fact that the author pays lip service to Aristotle and St. Thomas, the book is not designed to introduce the students to either Aristotle or St. Thomas; nor is it designed to inspire the student with a desire to read and appreciate the great philosophical works.

One could mark numerous philosophical mistakes which should not be perpetuated in our colleges, for example, "[a] judgment is an act of the mind pronouncing the agreement or disagreement of ideas among themselves" (p. 293). This Lockian definition of judgment will logically lead to some form of Idealism. "The agent intellect is a certain instinctive supra-sensory energy or power which acts spontaneously on the phantasm present in the synthetic sense or imagination and generates within itself an *intelligible cognitional image of the thing* presented by the phantasm" (p. 341). St. Thomas and Suarez would with difficulty recognize this caricature of the Aristotelian agent intellect.

To attempt to understand the nature of the spiritual without a metaphysical analysis of the nature of cognition will lead logically to some form of agnosticism or fideism. One cannot approach the philosophical study of the nature of man without a technical and concise application of metaphysical principles. The problem of the union of soul and body cannot be solved by merely saying, "Now the correct solution is the following." I am sure that the non-Catholic philosophers and scientists enumerated in the book and dismissed with a sentence or two, and a word of condemnation, would be as dissatisfied with the book as St. Thomas would be were he to read it. The philosophical problem is not so much that philosophers and scientists have been wrong, but why they have held these solutions and what error is to be avoided.

Textbooks in philosophy such as this will only perpetuate an unphilosophical and dogmatic attitude of mind that will not advance the intellectual development of Catholicism so badly needed in our colleges today. Basically the difficulty with this textbook is that it is a rehash of Maher's *Psychology* plus a summary of experimental psychologies and does not take into account the development in contemporary Catholic philosophy that has been made under the inspiration of men such as Boyer, Rousselot, Sertillanges, Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain, Gilson, Pegis, and others.

Again let me say the reviewer does not relish writing such a review, but there comes a time when silence cannot be excused.

W. L. Wade, S.J.

St. Louis University

Mediaeval Studies, Vol. VI. Mediaeval Institute, Toronto, 1944. Pp. 354. $5.00.

As might be expected, the high standard of scholarship in the previous num-

bers of this Toronto annual is more than adequately maintained by the studies published in the present issue. A detailed review of each, besides transgressing limitations of space, would require such expertness in several fields as is not usually possessed by a single reviewer. The following account of the contents of the seven articles in this volume may serve as a sufficient indication of their scope and probable interest to the reader.

Only the first two articles are explicitly philosophical. "The Mind of St. Augustine," by Anton C. Pegis (pp. 1-61), is an advance publication of a portion of the history of Scholasticism which Dr. Pegis is preparing for Messrs. Simon and Schuster. After a preliminary sketch of the man and his work, the author presents his interpretation of the mind of St. Augustine by outlining the various stages of the Saint's mental and spiritual development under three headings: the search and the ideal, truth and light, and man. The wealth of texts quoted and referred to under these headings is *prima facie* evidence of the thorough study which led the author to his conclusions; in many cases the conclusions themselves emerge so clearly from the passages quoted or summarized that they hardly need to be stated. The historical consequences of St. Augustine's thought are touched upon in the final section of the article, which is a sort of preview of the history of Augustinianism. In the preceding sections Dr. Pegis has been at pains to show how St. Augustine himself, by subordinating his rational speculations wholly to the central purpose of attaining union with God through faith and love, avoided the erroneous consequences of the Platonism from which he borrowed. In this final section the fact is stressed that by descending to the level of philosophy and by developing Augustinianism as a philosophy, many of the Christian disciples of St. Augustine had to face the inner exigencies of Neo-Platonism and became acutely aware of Greek thought "as a philosophical barrier to a Christian heaven and as a philosophical barrier to the integral Christianization of the world" (p. 57).

"Bonum commune melius est quam bonum unius: Eine Studie ueber den Wertvorrang des Personalen bei Thomas von Aquin," by I. Th. Eschmann, O. P. (pp. 62-120), is a very valuable contribution to the literature on St. Thomas's doctrine regarding the common good. Its primary purpose is to examine the use which St. Thomas makes of the *dictum authenticum* quoted in the title of the article. Father Eschmann's competence to deal with this topic will be clear to anyone who has studied his previous work on the same *dictum,* which was published in last year's *Mediaeval Studies* (Vol. V, 1943, pp. 142 ff.). Incidentally, the author avails himself of this opportunity to make a few corrections and additions in that previous article, by way of a footnote (p. 63). Those who have been interested in the recent discussions about "personalism" (of which Father Baisnée's article in *The Modern Schoolman* [Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 59-75] is an example) will note that Father Eschmann takes into account the views of writers on both sides of this controversy, and does not hesitate to criticize them sharply when necessary. An author whose own conclusions are based on a most careful analysis of all passages in St. Thomas relevant to the points that he is investigating is quite rightly critical of interpretations less solidly supported by a firsthand study of the texts; and if contemporary scholars find his outspoken strictures unpleasant, they may gain comfort from observing that Cajetan himself, admittedly "a prince among Thomists" (p. 74), is roundly taken to task for letting his preconceived ideas interfere with the demands of objective and impartial scholarship. It is to be hoped that this article will be translated into English and reprinted together with Father Eschmann's previous collection of St. Thomas's texts concerning the *authenticum,* so as to make the results of this admirable investigation available to a wider circle of readers.

"The Moment of Consecration and the Elevation of the Host," by V. L. Kennedy, C. S. B. (pp. 121-150), is of interest to students of the history of dogma and of liturgy. It proposes an explanation of the origin of the elevation of the sacred host in the Mass as we have it today which partly agrees with the view of Professor Dumoutet of Paris but completely rejects the assertion of the late Father Thurston that the elevation was decreed by the synod of Paris as a protest against Peter Cantor's teaching about the double consecration.

"The Hexameron of Robert Grosseteste: The First Twelve Chapters of Part Seven," by J. T. Muckle, C. S. B. (pp. 151-174), is predominantly theological in content. "It embraces his complete commentary on the first part of Genesis, i, 26. . . . The topics discussed in these chapters . . . are two: the Trinity and the sublime dignity of man's estate from his creation; . . . (p. 151). Father Muckle's introduction gives a summary of the contents of these chapters as well as his manuscript sources. The text itself with the variant readings fills seventeen pages.

"An Inquiry into the Origins of Courtly Love," by A. J. Denomy, C. S. B. (pp. 175-260), leads to the conclusion that the thought framework for the troubadours' conception of human love was provided by the elements possessed in common by the systems of thought prevalent at that period in the south of France: Neo-Platonism, Albigensianism, Arabic Neo-Platonism and Arabic mysticism (p. 257). The whole study is very fully documented and capably done, besides being up to date in its use of the literature on the subject. Particularly valuable to the philosopher are the author's excellent summaries of Neo-Platonism (pp. 193-221), which includes the Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena as well as Plotinus, and of Arabic philosophy (pp. 243-256), with special reference to Al-Kindi, Alfarabi and Avicenna.

"The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century," by G. B. Flahiff, C. S. B. (pp. 261-313), is a study of the limitation indirectly imposed on the Church's jurisdiction in England, from the reign of Henry II, by a royal writ which forbade ecclesiastical courts to take further cognizance of a case once the Church's right to adjudicate the case had been questioned. This article and two others which are to follow in later issues intend to study the nature of this writ and its workings down to the end of the thirteenth century.

"The Pilgrim-Diary of Nikulas of Munkathvera: The Road to Rome," by Francis P. Magoun, Jr. (pp. 314-354), is a translation from the Icelandic of the itinerary kept on his journey to Rome in 1154 by "Nikulas Bergsson, poet and apparently second abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Munkathvera . . . in the north of Iceland." For that part of the diary which records Nikulas' stay in Rome, the reader is referred to an article by Dr. Magoun in the *Harvard Theological Review* for 1940. A commentary on the places named in the diary precedes the translation itself, which is thickly dotted with the appropriate reference numbers and accompanied by a map showing the principal stopping places. A four-page list of books and articles is added to the translation, containing the literature referred to by abbreviations in the commentary. Though the diary is hardly more than a detailed list of place names, it contains a sufficient number of vivid little "asides" to justify its perusal by readers not particularly interested in early geography or church history.

It is not easy to see how any university library can afford to be without this scholarly annual, which has proved its worth by fostering research of the best type amid the unfavorable conditions of a world at war.

JOHN WELLMUTH, S. J.

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

BOOK NOTICES

LAVAL THEOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE. Publié par les Facultés de Théologie et de Philosophie de l'Université Laval, Quebec, 1945. Vol. I, No. I. $3.00 a volume.

The first number of this semiannual bilingual publication of Laval University contains a dozen papers of varying length and competence covering a wide field in theology and philosophy. Several of the longer studies presumably represent doctoral work and are to be continued in later issues. A recognizable unity of approach is achieved by the various contributors, most of whom emphasize a directly doctrinal solution of problems rather than a historical treatment. In general, the Aristotelian-Thomistic position is maintained, with frequent recourse to John of St. Thomas where further clarification is sought. Very welcome is the attention paid to modern scientists and philosophers and to issues of actual interest today, although in this respect there have been important modifications in the original plan for the review. (Cf. *Revue Neoscolastique de philosophie,* XLI [1938], 656.) In a special section to be devoted to "quodlibetic" questions and replies, professors at Laval engage to discuss relevant queries addressed to them. These features of the new journal indicate the special contribution which it will make to the growing theological and philosophical literature in Canada.

In "Notre participation au Sacerdoce du Christ: étude sur le caractère sacramental," L. Audet examines a subject which is becoming increasingly important to priests and the faithful owing to its intimate connection with the principles of Catholic Action. Of interest both to theologians and philosophers are the articles "La Connaissance du bien et du mal" (A.-M. Parent) and "Considérations sur quelques principes fondamentaux de la doctrine du spéculatif et du pratique" (H. Pichette). Parent's paper and that of C. De Koninck were prepared for the International Congress of Philosophy which met in Haiti in 1944 and to which most philosophical schools except American Scholasticism made significant contributions. Guided by the Christian teaching on the knowledge of good and evil that resulted from original sin, Parent evaluates the Hegelian philosophy of history, in which philosophical reason purports to uncover the necessary secrets of divine providence only dimly hinted at by religious faith. Pichette has provided a useful summary of the Scholastic teaching on the distinctions between speculative and practical knowledge. Another careful study of Scholastic doctrine is N. Marcotte's "The Knowability of Matter 'secundum se,'" which interprets apparently conflicting texts of Aquinas on this point in the light of the distinctions proposed by John of St. Thomas. M.-D. Chenu ("Ratio superior et inferior: un cas de philosophie chrétienne") offers a most suggestive essay on the reasons why present-day heirs of "baroque" Scholasticism continue to ignore the Augustinian distinction between *ratio inferior* and *ratio superior* which played so important a role in medieval theory of knowledge and psychology. They are paying a high price in their impoverished anthropology for neglecting this and other notions which are not easily fitted into a rigidly schematized Aristotelianism.

The remaining papers deal in a critical way with problems in modern philosophy. An attempt is made by E. Babin ("L'Objet de l'intuition sensible selon Kant et l'objet de la Physique mathématique") to compare Kant's teaching on scientific knowledge with the traditional notion of *scientia media.* In "Henri Bergson et la problème de la liberté," S. Cantin recounts the theme of Bergson's first major work. Although admitting the value of his teaching on time and space, freedom and determinism, Cantin is much less hopeful than Sertillanges about a possible synthesis of Aquinas and Bergson on these matters. More popular accounts of "La Philosophie du nazisme" and "La Critique marxiste de la religion" are supplied respectively by A. Viatte and H. Legault. Particular weak spots in the Marxist dialectic are exposed briefly by C. De Koninck in his "quodlibetic" "Notes sur le Marxisme" and, by implication, in his study of "La Dialectique des limites comme critique de la raison." This same approach is developed more at length by J. Lalor ("Notes on the limit of a variable") in a penetrating criticism of Engels' use of the mathematics of the infinitesimal in support of his theory of dialectics. Since this detailed paper is to be continued in the next number, the complete force of Lalor's argument cannot be estimated at present.

James Collins

St. Louis University

Prevoir Et Savior. By Yves Simon. Editions de l'Arbre, Montreal, 1945. Pp. 204.

This valuable little book lays down the principles for the solution of some of the vexing problems encountered by philosophers of science. The author shows how neither absolute determinism nor absolute indeterminism is characteristic of the course of events within the universe. Classical physicists assumed that from an initial state they could predict all future states of the world or of an isolated system. Twentieth-century physicists, however, have shown that it is impossible to predict some physical events with absolute certainty. Whenever there are many individual causes operating, collisions are always possible. Such collisions are the resultant of chance intersections between causes pursuing their own ends. Hence it is impossible to find in the causes themselves the reason for their collision. The greater the number of causes operating, the greater will be the probability of interference among them. It is not surprising, therefore, that the laws of microphysics should be statistical laws and that determinism should give way to indeterminism. Yet indeterminism itself cannot be understood except within a background of determinism. All events are not chance events, for natural causes possess fixed natures and definite modes of operation.

Dr. Simon's critical notes on some members of the Vienna Circle are clear and to the point. If the laudable effort of these philosophers to clarify the meaning of words is to bear fruit, they must investigate the nature of concepts and their relation to objective reality. By cutting themselves off from all reference to ontology they run the risk of undermining all science.

Next, the author discusses the nature and object of natural philosophy. To confuse natural philosophy with metaphysics is disastrous to metaphysics and extremely prejudicial to natural philosophy. Neither should one confuse science with natural philosophy, or natural philosophy with science. The object of the sciences on the first level of abstraction can be expressed in three equivalent terms: *ens mobile, ens sensible,* and *ens materiale.*

The final chapter outlines a plan for the reorganization of the psychological sciences. The present confusion can be eliminated by carefully determining the precise subject matter pertaining to each branch of psychology. Dr. Simon

suggests that the psychological sciences be classified as moral psychology, philosophical psychology, positive psychology, and applied psychology.

THEODORE J. WOLF, S.J.

Mount St. Michael's
Spokane, Washington

CATHOLIC ART AND CULTURE. By Edward Ingram Watkin. Sheed, New York, 1944. Pp. 226. $4.50.

The purpose of this book, as the title indicates, is to outline the development of Catholic art and culture.

In building his outline the author has made use of the metaphor of the seasons of the year, calling the early Christian era spring, the season of growth; the Middle Ages, summer, the season of promise; the Renaissance or baroque era, the autumn, season of fruitfulness; and the modern age, winter, season of death and decay. The metaphor is not too happy since the interpretation of it is quite arbitrary; but as the book refers to it frequently, it should be mentioned.

Briefly the author's thesis comes to this: a truly Catholic art and culture consists in the perfect balance of the horizontal and vertical tendencies in man's expression of himself; this was most perfectly achieved in what is usually called Baroque style. The horizontal tendency in man is that "which finds expression in secular knowledge, in culture and in art, a movement in harmony with the deification by the pagan nature-religions of natural forces and human powers" (pp. 4 and 5). The vertical movement, on the other hand, is "upward toward God, downward to the depths of the soul" (p. 5). These two tendencies are joined in Baroque art as matter and form, the matter being the classical forms, and the form being the Gothic spirit.

Most readers will probably find the thesis hard to accept especially as the arguments for it are very weak. The chief argument the author uses is that the classic art, the highest expression of pagan culture, when used to express Catholic ideals would be the perfect combination of the horizontal and vertical tendencies in man. This major premise is not proved. It would seem to most people who consider the subject that if the Gothic spirit is the Christian spirit, a more apt expression of it would be the Gothic forms. The Baroque art is more a culture of disintegration wherein a revived classicism forces a compromise with the true principles of Gothic.

The book is interesting and any one interested in art and culture will enjoy the author's appreciation of the works he mentions, particularly that of the third century statue of the Good Shepherd. But he is quite subjective, to say the least, on the Baroque examples he mentions. Speaking of Baroque, the author says, "I love it. And it is good to speak of what one loves." It will also be good for the reader to keep this in mind.

LEROY E. ENDRES, S.J.

St. Louis University

THE HEART OF MAN. By Gerald Vann, O.P. Longmans, New York, 1945. Pp. vii + 182. $2.00.

In *The Heart of Man,* Vann treats of "Man the Lover" and "Man the Maker." Under the first heading he examines and reaffirms the Christian view of man and lays down consequent principles of morality. Man hungers for all reality; the universe is sacred; let him view it and treat it with reverence. In doing this he finds himself and the vision of the whole. But sin is also real. Here the first great contrast is found between a Christian moral phi-

losophy and any other ethic. This is the vision of good and evil. Next we must examine man, the being of intellect and passions. Here, in the vision of man, we find the great potential of love. And love begets worship. While the man obeys, the child loves; both unite in the vision of the way of worship.

But "love is more than a state of being: it is an impulsion to act and to make" (p. 91). Under love, drudgery becomes creation. In love, man and woman complete their personalities. From love flows a sense of social responsibility, the desire to share in the making of a good world. And finally, there is a love of the Church that finds outlet in a spirit of loyalty. These things comprise the life of Man the Maker.

The foregoing summary tells of Vann's work. In this book he has labored to expose the notions essential in a true ethic. He seeks to strip these notions of the formality of Scholasticism. To a considerable extent he succeeds. Some parts of the book, however, do not make for easy reading. Unfortunately, this is true of the first chapter. The reason seems to be a lack of unity. Having surmounted this difficulty, however, the reader finds a somewhat clearer and more forceful presentation in other parts of the work.

It would be a pleasure to point out many of the fine things that appear in this short book. There are an honesty and strength that characterize a great many passages. There is a light that searches out new things and old. Note should be made of the exposition of a morality of worship as opposed to the individualist morality of the Greek, and of the elimination of conflict between notions of private and common welfare (p. 79). Vigor and clarity of treatment also characterize the comments on the lag in positive law and the social structure (p. 121), and the discussion of the morality of international cooperation (p. 130). And we must not pass over the noteworthy appendix, a consideration of the why and wherefore of Christian moral philosophy from the viewpoint of the modern critical mind. This is an attempt to resolve the difficulty of presenting an adequate morality to men who cannot abide the supra-experimental.

Donald Campion, S.J.

St. Louis University

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ANNOUNCEMENT

In THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN for March professors Yves Simon of the University of Notre Dame and Julien Peghaire, C.S.Sp., of the University of Montreal, will discuss the problems involved in the philosophical study of sensation. This discussion will be continued in future numbers of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

Father Peghaire received the doctorate in philosophy at the Roman Academy of St. Thomas and the doctorate in theology at the Gregorian University, Rome. Among other professorships he holds that of gnoseology at the University of Montreal.

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